

WELFARE REFORM AND CHILDREN: A Synthesis of Impacts in Five States

The Project on State-Level Child Outcomes

March 2004

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Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
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The Project on State-Level Child Outcomes

The Project on State-Level Child Outcomes is a collaboration among researchers, federal agencies, foundations, and representatives from state welfare offices to examine child and family well-being in the context of welfare reform. The project originated in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), under the leadership of the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE). In an initial phase of the project, HHS awarded one-year planning grants to 12 states to augment their ongoing experimental evaluations of welfare waiver policies with studies of how welfare reform affects children. During the fall of 1996 and the spring of 1997, state and federal representatives, researchers from the firms conducting the state evaluations of adult outcomes (MDRC, Mathematica Policy Research, and Abt Associates), researchers from Child Trends, and members of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) Family and Child Well-being Research Network, met to establish common terminology for discussing child outcomes, develop a conceptual model for how welfare policies affect child well-being, and choose the factors to be assessed in the evaluations.

Five of the initial 12 states (Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota) were then funded for a second phase of the project, in the fall of 1997, to carry out studies of child outcomes as part of their waiver evaluations. The state representatives and research teams continued to work together jointly to develop hypotheses about the impact of state waiver policies on child and family outcomes, finalize the most important outcomes to measure in their surveys, and develop surveys and procedures for data collection that were as similar as possible across the states.

This report is a synthesis of the findings from the five state evaluations. It was compiled by researchers from Abt Associates, Child Trends, MDRC, and Mathematica Policy Research. Researchers from Child Trends coordinated the preparation and writing of this synthesis.

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The results synthesized here are drawn from the separate reports for each of the five states participating in the project. For further details about the findings, please refer to the full reports for each state (see page 80 of this report for a list of these references).

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Executive Summary

This report focuses on the question of whether and how pilot welfare reform programs launched in five states—Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota—affected children’s developmental outcomes. We synthesize results from experimental studies (in which follow-up interviews ranged from 2.5 to 6.5 years after random assignment) in the five states, looking first at adult economic outcomes that the programs aimed to change (targeted outcomes), then turning to aspects of young children’s lives—including child care and the home environment—that may also have been changed by the programs, and focusing finally on how children themselves were affected by the programs. Through our analysis of impacts, we draw the following conclusions:

- We see little evidence that these welfare reform programs resulted in widespread harm or benefit to young school-age children (those between the ages of 5 and 12 at the time of the study). Overall, impacts for these children were relatively few in number (given the number of measures examined) and small in size. The five welfare reform programs were more likely to have statistically significant impacts on targeted outcomes for adults—employment, earnings, welfare receipt, and income—than on other outcomes for adults, on children’s lives, or on children’s functioning.
- Positive impacts on children’s functioning appear to be related to increases in family income. The welfare reform programs in the two states with the most consistent positive impacts on focal children—Connecticut and Minnesota—also increased family income. Florida’s program increased family income more modestly, but had neutral, rather than positive, impacts on children.
- Consistent with the increases in employment noted across the studies, the programs increased children’s participation in child care, and in some cases, increased their participation in formal settings such as center-based care and before- and after-school programs.
- Most of the programs showed only a few impacts (given the number of measures examined) on aspects of family life, such as stability or turbulence, parenting, the home environment, and the parent’s psychological well-being.
- In two of the states—Florida and Minnesota—the programs had the most favorable impacts on young school-age children in more disadvantaged families, such as those with a longer history of welfare receipt or less work experience. Conversely, for young school-age children in families least at risk of long-term welfare dependency, those impacts that did occur were negative. In the three other states (Connecticut, Indiana, and Iowa), there was little difference in the pattern of impacts on young school-age children by level of family disadvantage.

■ Where there were impacts on adolescents' school performance (for whom a more limited number of measures were collected), they were primarily negative.

■ Apart from any program impacts, the children in these families are experiencing multiple stressors, including high levels of economic disadvantage, parental depressive symptoms, and domestic violence. The average levels of well-being among the focal children themselves, where different from those for national samples of children (such as in health and behavioral problems), tended to look worse.

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Welfare Reform and Children: A Synthesis of Impacts in Five States

I. Introduction: Purpose of This Report

Concern about child well-being was the starting point for the first welfare policy in the United States, and child well-being has remained a concern in each successive wave of reform.² Yet most of the information available on the effects of welfare reform concerns outcomes for adults (such as welfare receipt, employment, poverty, and family income).

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services initiated the **Project on State-Level Child Outcomes** to broaden the focus of welfare evaluations to include not only adult outcomes, but also child outcomes.³ Findings from the five states participating in the project—Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota—are now available and are the focus of this report. We address the question of whether and how pilot welfare reform programs put in place in these five states affected the developmental outcomes of children.

Welfare waivers, granted by the federal government to more than 40 states in the early 1990s, provided states an opportunity to develop and test variations in their welfare policies. The waivers received by states during this period anticipated many welfare reform provisions put in place by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. States that were granted waivers, including the five states participating in the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes, were required to conduct rigorous experimental evaluations of their welfare reform demonstrations on adult outcomes and behaviors. The five states described in this report augmented their evaluations of adult outcomes by collecting comparable data focusing on children in the context of welfare reform.

Two features of the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes make its findings particularly useful for informing ongoing state choices about welfare policy. First, among a larger set of experimental studies focusing on the impacts of different welfare reform programs on children (which includes voluntary programs and programs targeted at teenage parents),^{4,5} the programs studied here most closely approximate those implemented in the states following passage of PRWORA in 1996. While the five state waiver programs do not reflect the *full* range of policies implemented in all 50 states, they do reflect contrasting approaches. The five state programs include, in different combinations and to different extents, such key policy elements as time limits on the receipt of welfare benefits, enhanced earnings disregards, stricter work requirements, and enhanced supports for working (such as improved administration of child care subsidies).

Second, because of a collaborative process, the five evaluations launched by this project involve nearly identical measures of child well-being and of the family and child care environments of the young school-age children who are the focus of this study. This coordination increases the potential to look *across* the results of the studies and to ask whether different state waiver policies (albeit as implemented in different state and local environments) affected children differently.


II. Overview of Methodology: Matching the Research Strategy to the Conceptual Model

Conceptual Model

While welfare policies originate out of concern for children, the specific provisions of different policies are aimed at adult behaviors. They target, or aim to change, such behaviors as employment and receipt of welfare. There are very few provisions aimed directly at children's well-being, for example by providing health or developmental screenings or through access to early childhood intervention services. Why, then, study child outcomes in the context of differing welfare waiver policies?

Building on earlier conceptual work for the Child Outcomes Study of the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies, the participants in the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes developed a conceptual model for how state welfare waiver policies might affect children.⁶ The conceptual model, in turn, shaped the measurement strategy used in all five state evaluations in their child outcomes studies, with specific measures being chosen to match each component of the conceptual model.

The conceptual model is presented in summary form in Figure 1. The underlying assumption of the model is that child outcomes can be indirectly affected by state welfare policies through their impacts on adult outcomes. Impacts on adult outcomes, in turn, are seen as having the potential to alter the immediate care environments of young children both in the home and in child care, and thereby the well-being and developmental outcomes of the children.



As can be seen in Figure 1, the conceptual model distinguishes between two aspects of adult life that can be affected by state policies: those *targeted by state waiver policies* (income and its sources, employment, and family formation), and *other aspects of adult life* that, while not targeted by the policies, may nevertheless be affected by assignment to the welfare reform program (parental psychological well-being, stability and turbulence in the family, absent parent involvement, use of health and human services such as food stamps and Medicaid, and consumption patterns). Program impacts on either the “targeted” adult outcomes or on the “non-targeted” adult outcomes have the potential to affect young children’s outcomes through impacts on two of their primary care environments (the home environment and parenting on the one hand, and the type, extent, and quality of child care on the other). Even in the absence of program impacts on such economic outcomes as family income, assignment to the program itself has the potential to affect the child’s experiences (for example, through program messages, increased support of a caseworker, or a sense of requirements that may affect parental psychological well-being and parenting behavior).

The model was used by the project team to guide selection of measures and to provide an overall framework for thinking about how impacts on young children might come about. We assumed that the model was not exhaustive, yet it identifies many of the key factors that could serve as pathways for transmitting impacts of the programs to children. The absence of arrows in the model is important to note: It indicates that at this early and exploratory phase of the work, it was not considered possible to specify and test a single sequence of steps (including the potential for complex reciprocal patterns) by which children were expected to be affected by welfare reform. Rather, the model was used to *generate* a set of plausible hypotheses.

Participants in the project developed hypotheses for impacts on children that were favorable as well as unfavorable, and hypothesized that these impacts could come about either through program impacts on economic well-being or through direct impacts on other aspects of children’s lives (e.g., if assignment to a program itself affected parents’ psychological well-being). For example, participants foresaw the possibility of positive child impacts occurring if programs increased family income or increased parents’ optimism about the future, resulting in favorable impacts in parenting and the home environment. The project team also foresaw the possibility that negative impacts on child outcomes could occur if assignment to a welfare program resulted in unstable employment—which could result in economic turbulence or instability in child care arrangements—or if the program increased parental stress about meeting program requirements. With data as to where impacts on these potential mediators did and did not occur in this set of evaluations, we hoped to work toward a more specified model or set of models for the future (while also acknowledging the need, in future work, for measures of further possible mediators or measures of greater sensitivity).

While most of the hypotheses that were articulated focused on potential impacts on young school-age children, participants also spoke of possible impacts on adolescent children of recipients.⁷ For example, impacts on older children could come about if these children saw a more positive role model in their parents when they made a transition to work, or alternatively, if they experienced a drop in parental supervision. Participants also underscored the importance of examining whether impacts for children occurred especially in particular *subgroups*, such as families at greater versus less risk of long-term welfare receipt. The project team emphasized the importance of examining child outcomes in multiple aspects (or domains) of development, given the possibility that impacts might occur in some but not all domains of children's development, or of impacts of a particular program being favorable for measures in one domain of development but unfavorable in another. The domains of development chosen for study were children's functioning in school, their health and safety, and their social and emotional well-being.

Matching the Research Strategy to the Conceptual Model

For each of the boxes shown in the conceptual model in Figure 1, the participants in the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes identified specific constructs to be measured. This involved reaching consensus on the highest-priority constructs to measure from a larger initial set.⁸ With regard to income, for example, participants in the project identified as core constructs to be measured: total income, sources of income (including earnings, child support, welfare benefits, food stamps, SSI, and funds from foster care or adoption), stability of income, and material hardship (e.g., having trouble paying the rent or utilities or having telephone service disconnected).

Some of the constructs, particularly those pertaining to adult economic outcomes, were already being measured through the administrative records data being collected for the experimental evaluations initially launched when each state's welfare waiver was obtained. For example, administrative records provided data on adult participants' earnings and employment (through Unemployment Insurance records) and welfare receipt (through records of welfare payment history).


Within the full administrative sample of each waiver evaluation, further information was collected through telephone surveys for a subsample of the full evaluation sample called the *client survey sample*. Surveys were considered necessary as part of these evaluations to collect information on outcomes not available in administrative records, such as employment benefits, use of human services, overall household income, and housing and neighborhood conditions.

To address the aspects of the conceptual model not covered by the administrative data or client survey, a more detailed survey was conducted in families' homes for a subsample of the client survey sample in each state. In all five states, this subsample (the focal child sample) included families with a child between the ages of 5 and 12 years at the time of the follow-up survey.⁹ For this survey, one child was selected at random in the appropriate age range in each family. This child was the focus (focal child) for questions concerning child development, family processes, and child care environments. Interviews were conducted in the families' homes to permit collection of detailed information about focal children's child care partici-

pation, to permit privacy in responding to sensitive questions (for example those about parental depressive symptoms and family violence), and so that interviewers could complete ratings of the support and stimulation available to children in the home environment. In Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Minnesota, the focal child sample included only single-parent families (mostly families with a single mother), while in Iowa some of the families were two-parent families, in keeping with the waiver policy in that state (as described in greater detail below). The measures used in these surveys were nearly identical across the states.

In four of the states participating in the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes (Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Minnesota), subsamples of families with children who were adolescents at the time of the follow-up survey (the adolescent sample) were also identified from within the client survey sample.¹⁰ Iowa did not identify this sample of adolescents. While survey measures were more detailed regarding young school-age (focal) children in the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes, the briefer set of measures regarding adolescent development provides an important opportunity to begin to explore whether the impacts on children are different in different age ranges.

Figure 2 illustrates how the focal child and adolescent child samples were drawn from the client survey sample in each state's evaluation, which in turn was drawn from the full administrative sample. Appendix Table 1 gives details about the focal child samples in each of the evaluations, while Appendix Table 2 provides information about the timing of the follow-up survey for the focal child and client survey samples. As can be seen, while the age range of the focal children at follow-up was constant across the five state evaluations, the timing of the follow-up (in terms of years after random assignment) varied somewhat across the states, ranging from 2.5 to 6.5 years after random assignment. This means that the children varied somewhat in age across the states at the start of the evaluations, and thus may have experienced the intervention over slightly different developmental periods and for different lengths of time.



Throughout the discussion of the findings that follows, the term **impact** refers to differences on outcomes between those assigned to the program group (subject to the requirements and supports of the particular welfare waiver policy) and those assigned to the control group (operating under the conditions of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] program and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training [JOBS] program) in these evaluations. The fact that each of the waiver evaluations followed an **experimental design**, with families assigned at random to the welfare waiver program or to a control group, assures that impacts on children as well as impacts on adults are attributable to the program and are not due to any pre-existing differences between families in the program and those in control groups.

Impacts on children may vary by the characteristics of the children or families at the start of the evaluation (for example, related to differences in children's age or families' levels of disadvantage). This synthesis looks across the five programs for overall patterns of impacts for children, as well as for patterns of impacts for key subgroups. Unless otherwise noted, all impacts discussed in this document are statistically significant at the .10 level.

The measures that are discussed in this report and that appear in the tables were selected by the project team from a larger set of measures appearing in each individual state evaluation report or were computed specifically for the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes.¹¹ The project team chose a concise set of outcomes that were measured comparably across the evaluations. Any differences in the measures are noted in the tables and in the technical appendix detailing how the measures were constructed.

In general, the tables appearing in the text contain program impacts for the focal child samples in each state, while the appendix tables contain separate state tables that present impacts for subgroups. In the case of Iowa and Minnesota, the tables distinguish different samples, and impacts are presented separately for these samples. Iowa distinguishes between *ongoing recipients* and *applicants* to the program because of the long period (three years) during which random assignment to the program took place. Minnesota distinguishes between *long-term recipients* and *recent applicants*, since these groups were subject to different program rules (see description in section III of this report).

III. Description of Programs and Their Policy Components

Key Elements of Programs

Through the waiver process, states were allowed to add to or modify their existing welfare programs prior to federal welfare reform in 1996. Many of the experimental policies anticipated those put in place by the 1996 federal legislation and thus continue to be used as part of state Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs. Below are some of the key policy components that were included in the five pilot programs evaluated here.

Time limits set restrictions on the number of months parents can receive welfare benefits. Reaching the time limit may involve reduction, rather than termination, of the welfare grant. In all of the programs, safeguards were available for those families who were least able to support themselves without the benefit of welfare.

Enhanced earnings disregards, or “make work pay,” strategies are designed to overcome the shortcomings of the low-wage labor market. Under AFDC, recipients could exclude the first \$30 plus one-third of their earnings when calculating their welfare benefits for the first four months of work (in addition to a \$90 work expenses credit). For the next eight months of work, only \$30 could be excluded (as well as the work expense credit); after that point, only the work expense credit could be excluded in calculating welfare benefits. Under the enhanced disregard policies, there was an increase in this amount of money that was not counted when calculating the welfare grant level over this level in the AFDC group. In effect, this allowed welfare recipients to keep more of their welfare benefits as they worked, and to receive a supplement to their earnings.

Work requirements and services involve mandates that parents participate in employment or employment-related activities as a condition of receiving welfare. Employment-related activities include education, training, and job-search activities, although job search is typically the most common activity. Sanctions for non-compliance usually involve reductions in the welfare grant level—sometimes partially, sometimes involving termination of the grant for a specified period. In most cases, participation was required for a broader section of the caseload than under the system to which the control group was subject (e.g., parents with children under age 3).

Other policies that played an important part of the programs evaluated here include: *parental responsibility mandates*, or requirements that parents ensure that their children are attending school regularly and that their immunizations are up to date; the *family cap*, or reductions in the amount by which the welfare grant is increased when welfare recipients have additional children; *child care assistance*, which varied across the programs, but often extended transitional child care subsidy benefits beyond the 12 months guaranteed under AFDC; changes to the *asset and vehicle limits*, or increases in the amount of assets or the value of vehicles that families could have without affecting their eligibility for welfare benefits; changes to *child support rules*, which typically increased the amount of child support recipients could keep while receiving welfare; and changes to *rules for two-parent families*, which typically eased eligibility rules for two-parent families by eliminating, for example, the requirement that the qualifying parent work fewer than 100 hours per month.¹²

As states have mixed and matched these different program components in their current TANF programs, so too did the programs evaluated in these studies combine several of these elements into their pilot programs. Because of the combinations of policy components used in these pilot programs, the effects of any single policy component cannot easily be identified in this report. Figure 3 displays the combinations of policy components represented by each of the pilot programs evaluated.

Individual State Policies

Below are descriptions of the five welfare reform programs that show how the policy components highlighted above varied across the programs.¹³

Connecticut's Jobs First Program

■ **Time limits.** Jobs First limited families to a cumulative total of 21 months of cash assistance receipt. Families who were exempt from participation requirements (e.g., incapacitated individuals and recipients caring for infants) were exempted from the time limit.¹⁴ In addition, during the study period, recipients could receive renewable six-month extensions of the time limit if they were earning less than the payment standard (their maximum welfare grant level) and had made a good-faith effort to find work.

■ **Enhanced earnings disregard.** To encourage and reward work, all earned income was disregarded—that is, not counted—when calculating recipients' cash grant and food stamp benefits as long as their earned income was below the federal poverty level.

■ **Work requirements and services.** Jobs First recipients were required to participate in employment services targeted toward quick job placement. Exemptions for parents with younger children were tightened so that only parents with children under age one were exempt from participation in employment-related activities (rather than parents with children under the age of three in the AFDC group); other exemptions were also lifted such that a broader proportion of the caseload was subject to the participation requirements. Families who failed to participate in activities were sanctioned, with the grant reduced by 20 percent for three months for the first instance of noncompliance, reduced by 35 percent for three months for the second instance, and canceled for three months for the third instance.

■ **Other policies.** Jobs First also called for other changes to traditional welfare rules. These included: 1) a *partial family cap*, so that if a recipient conceived a child while receiving welfare, she would have her benefits increased by only about \$50 as compared to about \$100 per month under AFDC; 2) changes to *child care assistance*, in which transitional assistance was provided as long as a family's income was below 75 percent of the state median; 3) changes to the *asset and vehicle limits*, so that a higher level of assets and vehicle value were excluded in determining eligibility for cash assistance eligibility; 4) changes to *child support rules*, under which all child support was passed through to the custodial parent and the first \$100 (rather than the first \$50 under AFDC) was disregarded in calculating benefits; and 5) changes to *two-parent family rules*, so that rules for cash assistance eligibility were equalized between single- and two-parent families.

Florida's Family Transition Program (FTP)

■ **Time limits.** Under FTP, most recipients were limited to 24 months of cash assistance receipt in any 60-month period. Particularly disadvantaged recipients were limited to 36 months of receipt in any 72-month period. The time limit did not affect eligibility for other programs such as food stamps

FIGURE 3

Policy Components in the Five States

Provision	Connecticut	Florida	Indiana	Iowa	Minnesota Full Program
Time limits	21 months, with extensions	24 or 26 months, with exemption ^a	24 months	No	No
Mandates, with more stringent sanctions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enhanced earnings disregards	Generous ^b	Modest ^c	None ^d	Modest ^c	Generous ^e
Family cap	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Child care assistance	Indefinite extension of transitional child care assistance	One extra year transitional child care assistance	No additional assistance	One extra year transitional child care assistance	Change to child care reimbursement

^a Participants were assigned a 24-month time limit unless they (1) had received AFDC for at least 36 of the 60 months prior to enrollment or (2) were under age 24 and had no high school diploma and had little or no recent work history.

^b Program group members in Connecticut who worked part time received a benefit of almost \$350 per month, and more than \$600 per month if they worked full-time.

^c Both Florida and Iowa program group members who worked part-time received a benefit of about \$100 per month, and parents working full-time received virtually no benefits in either state.

^d Actually, Indiana's program included a "fixed" earned income disregard, such that the welfare grant was fixed at the level of a recipient's initial earnings. Therefore, earnings could increase without further reductions in the welfare grant level.

^e Program group members in Minnesota who worked part time received a benefit of almost \$300 per month and about \$200 if they worked full time.

and Medicaid. Certain groups were exempt from the time limit, and exemptions were granted for those with medical problems. Those months that the recipient was incapacitated were not counted toward the time limit. (Many of the recipients eligible for exemption were never randomly assigned and therefore were not included in the study). While in theory, extensions were available for families reaching the time limit, these were rarely implemented in practice.

■ **Enhanced earnings disregard.** Under FTP, the first \$200 plus half of any remaining earnings were disregarded (that is, not counted) in calculating the family's monthly grant level. Although FTP disregarded a fairly large proportion of a recipient's earnings, the disregard's effect on a recipient's income was limited by Florida's relatively low welfare benefit levels (\$303 per month for a family of three).

■ **Work requirements and services.** FTP aimed to provide a rich array of services, including education, training, and job search to help participants prepare for and find employment. While both the FTP and AFDC group faced participation requirements, participants in the FTP group were more closely monitored than their AFDC group counterparts, and therefore were more likely to be sanctioned for noncompliance. Also, exemptions from requirements applied only to parents caring for children younger than six months old (instead of children younger than three years of age under AFDC rules). FTP participants received intensive case management provided by workers with very small caseloads. The program also provided increased funding for a variety of social services and such services were brought under the same roof in the program offices.

■ **Other policies.** Other policies implemented in FTP included: 1) *parental responsibility mandates*, in which parents were required to ensure that their children were attending school, speak with their children's teachers, and ensure that immunizations were up to date; 2) *child care assistance*, in which transitional child care assistance was provided for 24 instead of 12 months; and 3) changes to the *asset and vehicle limits*, excluding a higher level of assets and vehicle value in determining eligibility for cash assistance.

Indiana's Welfare Reform Program

■ **Time limits.** Indiana had a 24-month time limit on TANF receipt for adults who were required to participate in work activities. However, the time limit affected only the adult portion of the grant; children could continue to receive assistance under the program after the two years were up. Upon reaching the 24-month time limit, the adult portion of the grant was eliminated for 36 months (although a lifetime limit was imposed in 1997, so that adults could no longer resume TANF eligibility after 36 months).

■ **Enhanced earnings disregards.** Indiana's program did not include an enhanced earnings disregard, so participants were subject to the same disregard as under the AFDC system.¹⁵ During the first two years of the program, however, there was a fixed-grant policy: once the cash grant was reduced upon a recipient's entry into work, the grant was fixed at that level.

■ **Work requirements and sanctions.** The majority of adults in Indiana's program were required to participate in work activities. For most recipients, the primary activity was employment. Recipients who did not find work were placed in job search activities. Sanctions for noncompliance reduced the grant by the adult portion of the grant (\$90 per month). Until June of 1997, there was no difference between the program and AFDC groups with respect to exemptions from the participation requirements (with parents with children under age three exempt in both groups). In the welfare reform program, however, in mid-1997, exemptions were lowered to include parents with children younger than two, and by the end of 1997 exemptions included only parents with children younger than one.

■ **Other policies.** Indiana's program also included: 1) a *family cap*, under which a recipient could not have her benefits increased for children who were born more than 10 months after she began receiving TANF; 2) changes to the *asset* (but not to the vehicle) *limits*, excluding a higher level of assets in determining eligibility for cash assistance; and 3) *parental responsibility mandates*, under which parents were required to ensure that their children were immunized and attending school regularly.

Iowa's Family Investment Program (FIP)

■ **Time limits.** While recipients in Iowa were not subject to a uniform time limit on the receipt of welfare benefits, time limits were set as part of a Family Investment Agreement (FIA), a contract developed by the client and caseworker.

■ **Earned income disregards.** Under FIP, earned income disregards were expanded: FIP allowed a disregard of 60 percent of earnings.¹⁶

■ **Work requirements with sanctions.** FIP recipients were required to participate in employment and training activities as part of their FIA, specifying the activities in which the recipient would participate and support services to be provided by the state (as well as the intended date of exit from FIP, i.e., the time limit). Parents with children under six months were exempted from the requirements (as compared with parents with children under three years for the AFDC group).¹⁷ Sanctions became progressively stricter over time. Parents who failed to develop, sign, or carry through with an FIA were assigned to the Limited Benefit Plan (LBP). The LBP provided three months of full benefits, followed by three months of reduced benefits and six months of no benefits. In 1996, the LBP was revised to provide three months of reduced benefits followed by six months of no benefits; a second assignment to the LBP would lead to immediate termination of benefits for six months.

■ **Other policies.** FIP had several additional policy components, including: 1) *child care assistance*, in which transitional child care assistance was provided for 24 instead of 12 months; 2) changes to the *asset and vehicle limits*, which excluded a higher level of assets and vehicle value in determining eligibility for cash assistance; and 3) *eased eligibility for two-parent families*, in which the unemployed parent was no longer required to have

recent work history, and the requirement that the qualifying parent work fewer than 100 hours per month was eliminated.

Minnesota's Family Investment Program (MFIP)

■ **Time limits.** MFIP had no time limit on welfare benefits for either the MFIP or AFDC groups.

■ **Enhanced earnings disregard.** Under MFIP, a greater proportion of a family's earnings were disregarded when determining benefit levels. A working welfare recipient received the lower of the maximum grant increased by 20 percent, minus net income (62 percent of earnings), or the maximum grant. In addition, food stamp and AFDC benefits were combined into a single cash grant, allowing for greater discretion over spending.

■ **Work requirements and services.** Under MFIP, single parents who had received welfare assistance for 24 of the past 36 months were required to participate in employment and training activities in order to continue to receive their full grants. Individuals were exempt from participating if they had a child under age one (instead of under age three as in the AFDC group) or were working at least 30 hours per week. The focus of the activities was on rapid entry into employment. Long-term welfare recipients were immediately subject to the mandates, while applicants and shorter-term recipients were not subject to them until they had received welfare for at least two years. Sanctions involved a 10 percent reduction in the cash grant.

■ **Other policies.** MFIP also implemented other changes, including: 1) changes to *child care assistance*, in which MFIP paid child care expenses directly to the provider so that individuals did not have to get reimbursed after paying the provider themselves;¹⁸ 2) changes to the *asset and vehicle limits*, which excluded a higher level of assets and vehicle value in determining eligibility for cash assistance; and 3) changes to *two-parent family rules* equalizing a cash assistance eligibility rules between single- and two-parent families.

Comparisons Across the Programs: Time Limits, Generosity, and Sanctioning

Now we turn to a comparison of the welfare-reform programs on several key components: their time-limit policies, generosity, and sanction policies. This comparison provides information on both the incentives and the mandates provided by the programs to increase employment, giving us a closer look at the "carrots" and "sticks" used by the five programs.

Time-limit policies. Time-limit policies varied across the five programs. Three of the states (Connecticut, Florida, and Indiana) included time limits on welfare benefits. In all three states, the time limits were shorter than the five-year federal lifetime limit required under the 1996 law. Connecticut's time limit was the shortest, at 21 months, but six-month extensions were granted to families if they were not earning sufficient amounts when they reached the limit. About two-thirds of families who reached the time limit in Connecticut's program were granted

at least one extension. Indiana limited families to two years of cash assistance for the adult portion of the grant; however, there was no time limit on the child portion of the grant. Florida's time limit did result in a termination of the welfare grant, and it limited families to two or three years of cash assistance, depending on the families' level of disadvantage. However, exemptions were granted during the study period for medical reasons, thus all of the months a family received cash assistance may not have been considered in counting the number of months toward the time limit. Therefore, while all three programs implemented time limits of shorter duration than the federal five-year lifetime limit, in all cases the policies represent cautious approaches to time limits that are, in fact, more cautious than time-limit policies currently in effect in many states.

To put these policies in perspective, 40 states currently have time limit policies that result in benefit termination.¹⁹ Of those, 23 have time limits of 60 months in duration, while 17 have time limits of shorter than 60 months, as with the programs evaluated here. The other 10 states and the District of Columbia either do not have time limits, or have time limits that reduce or modify the grant, rather than resulting in a termination of benefits (as in Indiana's policy). This latter group of states comprises half of the national caseload of welfare recipients.

Generosity. As shown in Table 1, the programs varied considerably in their generosity, in part due to differences in the size of the AFDC grant, and in part due to the nature of the disregard, that is, the amount of earnings that were not counted in calculating welfare benefits. Grant levels in the five programs ranged from a low of \$290 in Indiana to a high of \$543 in Connecticut. Minnesota's and Connecticut's grant levels were the highest, while Florida's and Indiana's were the lowest.

Along with the variation in the level of the cash assistance grant, differences in the earnings disregard resulted in substantial diversity in the amount of cash assistance program families could keep as they went to work, relative to members of the AFDC group (see Figures 4 and 5 for a visual comparison of monthly income at different earning levels in the five states). Connecticut's program was the most generous, with program group members allowed to keep their entire welfare grant, as well as their food stamps, as they went to work—a benefit of almost \$350 per month if parents went to work part time and more than \$600 per month if they went to work full time. The disregard was offered to families as long as they earned less than the poverty threshold (\$1,111 a month for a family of three in 1997). Minnesota's program was the second-most generous, providing almost \$300 per month in benefits for part-time workers, and about \$200 per month in benefits for full-time workers. Also, because these benefits were not time-limited, families could receive them for a longer period than they could in Connecticut, and they could receive both AFDC and food stamps as cash payments until they earned 140 percent of the poverty level (although the AFDC portion of the grant phased out at a lower level of earnings, at around \$1,000 earnings).

Florida's and Iowa's programs were similarly generous for part-time work, offering about \$100 in benefits to families working part time. But full-time working parents received virtually no additional welfare benefits from these programs.

Prior to July 2000, Indiana's program did not provide an enhanced disregard, and thus there was no additional benefit to families who were working beyond that provided by the AFDC program (making it the least generous of the programs). Also, because the grant level in this state was the lowest of the states examined, families making as little as just over \$400 per month did not receive any additional benefit from cash assistance. During the first two years of the program, however, the fixed grant policy enabled some families who increased their earnings to continue to receive a small welfare check.

How do these supplements compare with those provided by programs now in effect? The federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) currently provides nearly \$4,000 per year to a parent with two children who works full time at a minimum-wage job, more than the benefit of Minnesota's program but less than that of Connecticut. California now allows welfare recipients who have jobs to keep the first \$225 of their monthly earnings without having their welfare benefits reduced. Beyond that point, each additional dollar of earnings reduces their benefits by only half a dollar (rather than reducing benefits by about a dollar for every dollar of earnings as under AFDC), a benefit similar to some of the more generous programs here.²⁰ At the same time, most states have included enhanced earnings disregards as part of their TANF programs.

TABLE 1

**How the Different State Programs Affected Family Income:
Monthly Income at Selected Levels of Earnings for Single Parents
Under Each of the Five Welfare Reform Policies, in Dollars**

	Monthly Income for Parent Working		Maximum cash assistance grant (zero earnings)	Earnings at which cash assistance equals zero ^b
	20 hours per week at \$6.00 per hour ^a	40 hours per week at \$6.00 per hour ^a		
Connecticut Program	1324	1846	543	1138
Connecticut AFDC	975	1172	543	663
Difference	349	674	0	475
Minnesota Program	1162	1360	532	1030
Minnesota AFDC	874	1150	532	652
Difference	288	210	0	378
Iowa Program	932	1151	426	1065
Iowa AFDC	826	1146	426	546
Difference	106	5	0	519
Florida Program	916	1172	303	806
Florida AFDC	837	1172	303	423
Difference	79	0	0	383
Indiana Program	829	1163	288	410
Indiana AFDC	829	1163	288	410
Difference	0	0	0	0

Note: ^aIncome includes earnings, cash assistance, and food stamps.

^bThis is for cash assistance only and does not include food stamps.

Sanction policies. The five programs also differed in their sanction policies, that is, the way they handled noncompliance for participation in the mandatory employment services. In both Connecticut and Iowa, sanctions for noncompliance reduced the monthly grant by a portion of the grant initially (these are known as partial family sanctions), followed by full family sanctions, or complete termination of the cash grant. In Indiana and Minnesota, sanctions involved only partial family sanctions. In Florida, sanctions for both program and AFDC groups involved partial family sanctions until the middle of the follow-up period. At that point, both groups became subject to full family sanctions. However, because the Family Transition Program group was more closely monitored, they were more likely to be sanctioned than the AFDC group. In comparison, while 33 states currently have partial sanctions in place as the first penalty that welfare recipients face for nonparticipation, in only 15 of these states are such partial sanctions the maximum sanction imposed on families. The other states impose full family sanctions, eliminating the family's entire welfare grant.²¹



FIGURE 4**Monthly Income for Participants Working 20 Hours per Week at \$6.00 per Hour Under the Five Welfare Reform Programs**

FIGURE 5**Monthly Income for Participants Working 40 Hours per Week at \$6.00 per Hour Under the Five Welfare Reform Programs**

IV. Impacts on Targeted Adult Outcomes

Having described the purpose of this report and key features of the programs studied, we turn now to the question of how these five state welfare programs affected the adult and family outcomes that they targeted. Table 2 presents program impacts on employment, earnings, welfare receipt, and income, as well as the average level of these outcomes for control group members (who received welfare but were not subject to welfare reform policies). State administrative records are the source for all of the outcomes in Table 2 except for the measure of total household income in the month prior to the survey. This measure comes from the client surveys conducted in each state. Table 2 indicates for which sample (e.g., focal child sample, full administrative sample, client survey sample) the numbers are calculated.²²

We drew the following conclusions regarding the impact of the programs on the adult outcomes they targeted:

Pilot welfare reform programs were more likely to have statistically significant impacts on targeted outcomes for adults—employment, earnings, welfare receipt, and income—than on other outcomes for adults, on children’s lives, or on children’s functioning.

Specific welfare reform policies varied considerably across the state programs, but the primary targets were increasing employment and earnings, reducing reliance on welfare, and (for at least some programs) increasing income. For employment and earnings, four of the programs had statistically significant impacts in the direction intended (favorable impacts were not found for ongoing recipients and applicants in Iowa or for recent applicants in Minnesota). In addition, three programs (Connecticut, Florida, and Indiana) decreased the rate of welfare receipt over the follow-up period, while one program (Minnesota) increased the rate of welfare receipt and welfare payments for both the long-term recipients and recent applicants. Results for income were mixed. Average annual income increased in three programs (Connecticut, Florida, and Minnesota). Total household income in the month prior to the survey increased in Connecticut and decreased for applicants in Iowa.

In contrast to the impacts on employment, earnings, welfare receipt, and income, statistically significant program impacts were less common for other outcomes—including outcomes for children, as discussed below—that were not the direct target of welfare reform policies. While welfare reform was expected to affect children *indirectly*, it is not surprising that impacts were more likely to be found for the targeted outcomes; policies such as work requirements were aimed at changing adult behaviors and few provisions were focused directly on children.

In four states, welfare reform increased employment, with impacts varying across subgroups.

Consistent with their focus on employment, programs in four states (Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Minnesota) produced statistically significant increases in

How the Different State Programs Affected Targeted Outcomes: Control Group Levels and Program Impacts Under Each of the Five Welfare Reform Programs

	Connecticut	Florida	Indiana	Iowa ^e	Minnesota ^e
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Recent Applicants
					Long-Term Recipients
					Control
					Impact
Focal Child Sample					
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up ^d (%) (administrative data)	49.1 (7.2***)	48.2 (6.9***)	50.0 (4.5***)	55.3 (1.3)	57.7 (15.1***)
Average annual earnings, in dollars (administrative data)	6,215 (453***)	3,639 (958***)	4,734 (572***)	6,203 (-195.0)	3,906 (751*)
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%) (administrative data)	50.7 (-1.8**)	45.0 (-4.4***)	44.1 (-5.5***)	58.1 (2.8)	86.5 (4.5**)
Average annual welfare payments received, in dollars (administrative data)	2,707 (59)	1,376 (-237****)	1,436 (-294****)	2,390 (42)	6,458 (556**) 3,772 (757****)
Focal Child or Full Administrative Sample ^b					
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC, TANF, and Food Stamps, in dollars (administrative data)	10,376 (591***)	7,250 (549**)	8,176 (153)	10,288 (-143.0)	13,104 (-1,008)
Year 1	9,584 (1,160***)	7,409 (223)	7,426 (-7)	9,067 (111.0)	11,663 (-631)
Year 2	10,037 (1,121***)	7,065 (649**)	7,579 (27)	9,877 (-326.0)	12,378 (-994)
Year 3	10,647 (172)	7,092 (790**)	8,054 (-101)	10,385 (-212.0)	14,727 (-1,799)
Year 4	11,249 (-132)	7,432 (533)	8,545 (207)	10,665 (-183.0)	13,614 (114)
Year 5	n/a	n/a	9,247 (498)	11,448 (-106)	n/a n/a
Year prior to survey ^c				14,840 (-1,350)	
Client Survey Sample					
Total household income in the month prior to survey, in dollars (survey data) ^d	1,464 (86*)	1,379 (89)	1,699 (-38.92)	1,413 (55)	1,988 (-213****)
					1,459 (-24)
					1,838 (75)

Note: *** $p < .01$. ** $p < .05$. * $p < .10$.

note: $\chi^2 = 10.1$, $p < .05$, $p < .10$

The average quarterly employment rate is not available for Minnesota, so the average annual employment rate is presented.

^bFor information on average annual income and income for years 1 through 5, data from the focal child sample were used where available (Florida, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota). In Connecticut, the full administrative sample was used.

For information on average annual income and income for years 1 through 5, data from the 1999 "Year prior to survey" was included for Iowa due to the length of the intake period in this study.

near prior to survey was included for rowa due to the length of the intake period in this study.

dTotal household income includes earnings from all household members, AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp payments, Child Support, and other sources. See Appendix Table 3 for further detail on measures.

total nonstudent income includes earnings from an nonstudent member, RD/DC/PAINT, food stamp payments, Child Support, and other sources; see Appendix Table 3 for further detail on measures.

Long-term recipients and recent applicants.
See section II of the text for more detail.

n/a: not available

employment rates (although in Minnesota, positive employment impacts were found for long-term recipients but not for recent applicants). Estimated impacts on average quarterly employment rates ranged from 15 percentage points for long-term recipients in Minnesota to one percentage point (not statistically significant) for both ongoing recipients and applicants in Iowa. The median employment impact across the programs was five percentage points, comparable in size to employment impacts found for other welfare reform programs.²³ When found, employment impacts persisted for all or most of the follow-up period.

In Connecticut, Indiana, and Minnesota, estimated impacts on employment were larger for relatively disadvantaged subgroups, defined differently across the studies.²⁴ In Florida, impacts did not differ significantly across subgroups. (See Appendix Tables 4 through 8 for subgroup impacts on targeted outcomes.)

The pilot programs in Connecticut, Florida, and Minnesota (for long-term recipients) increased average annual income (measured from administrative records). Total household income in the month prior to the survey increased in Connecticut but decreased for applicants in Iowa. The pattern of impacts on income is generally consistent with differences across states in the generosity of financial incentives.

The welfare reform programs in Connecticut, Florida, and Minnesota (for long-term recipients) produced positive impacts on average annual income over the follow-up period (measured by administrative records as the sum of earnings, AFDC payments, and food stamp benefits). Average annual income increased by about \$1,300 in Minnesota (for long-term recipients), \$1,100 in Connecticut (during the first two years after random assignment), and \$500 in Florida. In Indiana and Iowa, the programs had no statistically significant impacts on clients' average annual income.

A different pattern of impacts emerged from the survey measure of total *household* income in the month prior to the survey.²⁵ The survey measure was designed to capture all sources of income, including the earnings of other household members; consequently, average income (annualized) was higher when measured from survey data than from administrative records. Current monthly household income increased in Connecticut (by \$86 a month or \$1,032 annually) but, in contrast to the findings for average annual income over the follow-up period, did not increase in Florida or Minnesota. In Iowa, current monthly household income *decreased* by \$213 (or more than \$2,500 annually) for applicants.

The two states with the most consistent positive impacts on income were Minnesota (where increases in income were sustained throughout the study period for long-term recipients) and Connecticut (which was the only state to show an increase in income in the month prior to the follow-up interview, although annual income impacts were present only in the first two of the four years for which information was collected). In Florida, program group members experienced an increase in average annual earnings and income, and an increase in the second and third (of four) years for which information was collected. Indiana's program increased overall earnings, but increased neither income in any individual year during the study period nor average annual income.

In contrast, annual earnings, annual income, or income in any individual year during the study periods did not increase for recent applicants in Iowa and Minnesota. In fact, the earnings for program group members in these two programs were sometimes lower than that of their respective AFDC groups, although the difference was only statistically significant in one case—as noted above, in the month prior to the survey, Iowa’s program decreased household income.

Differences in income impacts across states are for the most part consistent with differences in earnings disregards. The two states with the largest estimated income increases, Connecticut and Minnesota, had the most generous earnings disregards. As a result, the programs in these two states did not decrease average welfare payments (though the average rate of welfare receipt decreased significantly in Connecticut). Indeed, Minnesota’s program *increased* average annual welfare payments (because participants could continue receiving welfare when they had more earnings). Florida, the other state with a positive impact on income, had a modest earnings disregard. Indiana’s program had the least generous disregard, produced the largest negative impact on AFDC payments, and did not increase income. Iowa’s disregard was roughly comparable in generosity to Florida’s disregard.²⁶

In Connecticut, the positive impacts on income faded in the third year after random assignment, when some families began to reach the state’s time limit on AFDC receipt. Income impacts also faded in Florida (in year four). In Minnesota, which did not impose a time limit on welfare receipt, the positive impacts on income for long-term recipients were sustained throughout the follow-up period. Section VII examines the relationship between impacts on income and impacts on children.

V. Impacts on Non-Targeted Adult and Family Outcomes

Given that the state welfare reform programs largely affected the outcomes they targeted, a next logical question is whether important changes occurred in children’s daily environments—such as their child care experiences or their home environments—in response to these programs.

We turn first to the question of how these programs affected children’s child care experiences and then to how they affected other aspects of children’s environments. Table 3 presents impacts on these non-targeted outcomes for families with focal children. Impacts for subgroups of families in these programs are found in Appendix Tables 9 through 13.

Consistent with the increases in employment noted across the studies, the programs increased children’s participation in child care, and in some cases, increased children’s participation in formal settings, such as center-based care and before- and after-school programs.

Child care is both a support for parental employment and a context for children’s development.²⁷ Child care use was expected to increase when parents transitioned from welfare to employment. Questions remained, however, about whether and

how welfare reform would affect the types of child care arrangements children used and the prevalence of self care among school-age children.

The child care measures available across the studies are parental reports of children's participation in different types of arrangements, including the use of self care.²⁸ All five programs examined measures of regular child care use over some portion of the follow-up period (referred to as "ever any" child care, formal care, and self care in Table 3), as well as the primary child care arrangement at the time of the follow-up survey.²⁹

With some exceptions, the programs increased children's participation in child care over a portion of the follow-up period (see Table 3). In Minnesota, the impacts on participation were found only for long-term recipients in the full program, a finding consistent with the impacts on employment for this subgroup (as opposed to the recent applicant group, where neither parental employment nor child care use increased). Similarly, no increases in child care participation were found in Iowa (for either the ongoing recipients or the applicants), which is also consistent with the lack of employment impacts for these groups. Even in the absence of parents' assignment to a welfare-to-work program, the majority of children experienced some type of nonparental care over the follow-up period, with control group participation ranging from close to 60 percent in Florida to almost 90 percent among recent applicants in Minnesota.

Where increases were noted in child care participation over the follow-up period, corresponding increases in the use of any formal care were found in Florida, Indiana, and for long-term recipients in Minnesota (see Table 3). Thus, school-age children in these programs increased their participation in center-based arrangements, extended-day programs, lessons, or activities. Changes were found in the prevalence of self care over the follow-up period, but the direction was mixed. Self care decreased for the most advantaged subgroups in Indiana—those with the most work history and the applicant group. In Connecticut and Iowa, however, the use of self care over the follow-up period increased (from 4.8 percent to 7.1 percent in the full sample for Connecticut, and from 10.9 percent to 15.3 percent for applicants in Iowa) (see Appendix Tables 9 through 13).³⁰

There were few impacts on *current* use of formal care as a primary arrangement. Large increases were found on this measure for applicants in Iowa's Family Investment Program and the subgroup least at risk for welfare dependency in Connecticut's Jobs First program. Data were not available to determine whether there were corresponding impacts on *concurrent* employment in these sites. However, an examination of available impacts on employment, earnings, and income revealed little about why the impacts on formal care came about for these groups. In Connecticut, there were no impacts on average employment rates, earnings, or income in the last two years of the follow-up period (years three and four) that might at least partially explain the impacts on current use of formal care for the subgroup that was least at risk.³¹ In Iowa, total household income in the month prior to the survey *decreased* for the applicants by \$213 a month, but there were no impacts on average earnings, employment, or income. One possible

TABLE 3**How the Different State Programs Affected Non-Targeted Outcomes: Control Group Levels and Program Impacts Under Each of the Five Welfare-Reform Programs**

	Connecticut		Florida		Indiana		Iowa^a				Minnesota^a			
							Ongoing Recipients		Applicants		Long-Term Recipients		Recent Applicants	
	C†	I†	C	I	C	I	C	I	C	I	C	I	C	I
Child Care														
At survey, primary child care arrangement was formal (%)	7.3	(1.3)	9.9	(0.2)	9.7	(0.0)	9.4	(-1.3)	5.9	(4.6**)	16.0	(1.8)	20.5	(3.3)
Ever any self-care (%)	4.8	(2.3*)	7.1	(0.9)	6.3	(-1.2)	12.2	(-1.1)	10.9	(4.4*)	16.2	(-2.5)	18.1	(2.2)
Ever any child care (%)	83.5	(6.3***)	59.6	(5.5*)	66.8	(6.6)	77.1	(0.8)	83.3	(-1.5)	78.0	(9.9***)	87.8	(-0.9)
Ever any formal care (%)	43.3	(3.8)	34.2	(6.4**)	30.6	(3.8*)	39.9	(-1.5)	45.0	(2.2)	42.3	(10.6***)	48.8	(4.9)
Parenting and the Home Environment														
Total Modified HOME scale, mean score (range from 1 to 3 in CT, FL, MN; from 0 to 1 in IN, IA) ⁺	2.5	(0.0)	2.4	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(-0.0)	2.3	(0.0)	2.4	(-0.0)
Modified HOME Cognitive Subscale, mean score (range from 1 to 3 in CT, FL, MN; from 0 to 1 in IN, IA) ⁺	2.2	(0.0*)	2.1	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(-0.0)	2.2	(0.0)	2.3	(0.0)
Routines Scale, mean score (range from 1 to 3 in CT, FL, MN; from 1 to 4 in IN, IA) ⁺	2.5	(-0.0)	2.5	(0.0)	3.3	(0.0)	3.4	(0.0)	3.4	(0.0)	2.3	(0.0)	2.3	(0.0)
Physical Environment Scale, mean score (range from 1 to 3) ⁺	2.7	(0.0)	2.6	(0.0**)	2.6	(0.0**)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.5	(-0.0)	2.6	(-0.0)
Abuse by intimate partner last year (%)	20.8	(0.9)	24.5	(-1.0)	29.6	(1.4)	23.2	(6.8*)	19.8	(8.1**)	28.5	(-6.7*)	19.1	(2.2)
Abuse by other person last year (%)	14.9	(3.6*)	19.3	(-0.9)	24.1	(-0.0)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33.0	(-8.4**)	23.1	(3.8)
Ever any abuse since random assignment	35.4	(0.4)	42.8	(-0.8)	55.0	(2.7)	49.8	(3.2)	42.6	(6.7)	59.6	(-10.5)	49.1	(-0.4)
Psychological Well-Being														
Total depression score (20 items, range from 0 to 60)	13.4	(0.5)	14.1	(-0.1)	15.1	(-1.0)	12.6	(0.0)	9.1	(1.2)	19.0	(-1.5)	14.2	(1.0)
Parental warmth, mean score (range from 1 to 4, Indiana range 0 to 3, Iowa range 0 to 2) ⁺	2.9	(-0.0)	3.0	(0.0)	2.7	(0.0)	1.8	(0.0)	1.8	(0.0)	3.5	(0.0)	3.4	(0.1)
Parental aggravation, mean (range from 1 to 4)	1.6	(-0.0)	1.6	(0.0)	1.7	(-0.1)	1.6	(0.0)	1.6	(0.0)	1.9	(-0.1)	1.7	(0.0)
Harsh parenting, mean score (range from 1 to 4, Indiana range 0 to 3, Iowa range 0 to 2) ⁺	1.7	(-0.1)	1.6	(0.0)	1.8	(0.0)	0.5	(0.0)	0.5	(0.0)	1.7	(0.0)	1.5	(0.1**)
Parental supervision, mean (range from 1 to 5)	4.8	(0.0)	4.6	(-0.1)	4.7	(0.0)	4.6	(0.0)	4.7	(0.0)	4.5	(0.1**)	4.6	(-0.1)
Family Turbulence														
Currently married and living with spouse (%)	10.8	(-1.6)	19.1	(-1.9)	23.9	(-1.4)	27.2	(1.5)	44.9	(-4.4)	6.2	(5.0**)	20.8	(2.7)
Currently married to focal child's biological father (%)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	7.5	(-2.0)	12.7	(-3.7)	23.0	(-0.1)	0.9	(1.8)	8.2	(1.8)

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

† C: Control group level, I: Program impact

+ Items and scaling may vary by site. See Appendix Table 3 for more details on measures.

^aLong-term recipients and recent applicants in Minnesota are presented separately because the program differed for these two groups. The Iowa sample is split into ongoing recipients and applicants because of the length of the intake period in this study. See section III of the text for more detail.

n/a: not available

reason applicants experienced a decline in income is that they were paying for formal care for their children. Alternatively, applicants may have been receiving child care subsidies to help cover the cost of formal care.

Most of the pilot welfare reform programs showed few impacts on family life, given the number of measures examined relating to parents' psychological well-being, family stability or turbulence, the quality of the home environment, and parenting practices.

One of the important routes through which welfare reform was expected to affect children was through changes in parenting and the quality and stability of the home environment for children. To examine whether or not these family outcomes were affected by welfare reform, the five state studies measured some aspects of stability and turbulence in the home environment; the organization, stimulation, and emotional support available in the home; and parental psychological well-being. We note that the measures of the home environment and parenting were assessed specifically for the focal children in these studies (those aged 5 to 12 years at the time of the follow-up survey) and do not necessarily provide information on the parenting or home environments of the adolescents discussed later in this document (see Appendix Table 3 for more details on these measures).

The five state welfare reform programs generally had few impacts on these outcomes either across programs or within any one program even though, as noted above, some of the programs had important impacts on family income and employment, which we expected would influence the home environment and parenting. It is possible that the short, parent-reported measures used in the studies were not sensitive enough to detect changes that may have occurred in emotionally supportive parenting, the organization of the home environment, and other important aspects of parenting and the home environment. It could also be the case that the differences between the program and control groups were not large enough to result in impacts on these outcomes.

Three programs influenced aspects of stability or turbulence in the home environment, although they varied in the direction and magnitude of impacts. Connecticut's Jobs First Program increased homelessness over the previous two years and increased abuse by unrelated persons (primarily verbal abuse by individuals at the respondents' places of employment—data not shown in Table 3; see original report for details).³² Iowa's Family Investment Program increased the use of foster care services among applicants, aspects of family instability (such as moving, doubling up, and moving in and out with partners), and domestic violence by intimate or ex-intimate partners (data not shown in Table 3, see original report for details).³³ Iowa's program also decreased rates of marriage among applicants (data not shown in Table 3; see original report for details). Minnesota's Family Investment Program decreased parental reports of domestic abuse by intimate partners and other unrelated persons and increased rates of marriage for long-term recipients.

Three of the five programs had impacts on parenting, but the impacts varied in direction. Connecticut's program improved the cognitive stimulation available in

the home environment, such as how often the children are read to. Connecticut's program decreased harsh parenting. Florida's program decreased parental supervision, or knowledge of their children's activities. Two of the programs improved aspects of the children's home environments. Florida's improved interviewer ratings of the physical home and neighborhood environment, with decreases noted specifically in the presence of garbage, litter, and hazardous materials. For recent applicants in Minnesota, the program increased harsh parenting, such as scolding and loss of temper. For long-term recipients in Minnesota, the program increased parental supervision. Iowa's program had no impacts on parenting or the organization of the home environment.

Indiana reduced parental depressive symptoms as measured by the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D) scale.³⁴ Indiana's program also decreased parenting stress or aggravation, a scale measuring parental perceptions, for example, about how difficult children are to care for.

Impacts on family life, where found, were also somewhat more favorable for the most disadvantaged groups in these programs than for their less disadvantaged counterparts. For instance, the impacts discussed earlier for Minnesota's program differ for long-term recipients and recent applicants. Likewise, while the Florida program had few impacts on non-targeted outcomes, those impacts that were found were in an unfavorable direction (involving slight decreases in family routines and parental supervision) for families least at risk of welfare dependency and were more positive (with slight increases in family routines and the home physical environment) for families most at risk of welfare dependency.

In sum, these programs led to a small number of impacts on children's home environments, parenting behavior, and parents' mental health. Further analyses are needed to assess whether or how much these changes ultimately have implications for child well-being. Even a small change in one aspect of family life, such as parental experience with domestic abuse and harsh parenting, could produce short-lived or permanent changes in children's well-being. However, it may also be that changes in family life were not important pathways through which these programs influenced children, or that the measures were not sufficiently sensitive to detect impacts on family life.

VI. Impacts on Children

The previous two sections provided information about how aspects of children's family environments were (or were not) changed by the five state welfare-reform programs. We turn now to the question of how children themselves were affected by these programs. We first discuss impacts on focal children, those who were between five and 12 years of age at the time of the follow-up survey and who were the focus of these five studies. We then turn to the question of how older children-teenagers, specifically-were affected by these programs. For all children, information on well-being was reported by their parents.

Turning to impacts on focal children, we see little evidence that the welfare reform programs resulted in widespread

harm or benefit to young school-age children. Overall, impacts for these children were relatively few in number (given the number of measures examined) and small in size.

Table 4, which presents the impacts on focal children's outcomes in these five studies, demonstrates that impacts on children were not widespread in these evaluations. The vast majority of the differences in program group and control group children's well-being were not statistically significant.

Moreover, the significant impacts that were found can be considered small in size based on a commonly used set of statistical guidelines. Cohen offered a standard—albeit exploratory in nature—for judging the size of the differences between two groups, suggesting that effect sizes³⁵ of a magnitude of .3, .5, and .8 can be considered small, medium, and large, respectively. Most of the effect sizes in these five evaluations ranged from .09 to .17, falling under the category of a small effect, by Cohen's definition.³⁶ In fact, even the largest of the impacts, which tended to occur for children in certain subgroups of families (see below), were almost always below .30 (see Appendix Table 19 for the range of effect sizes within each of the studies). While it is possible that even small increases or decreases in children's well-being could bring meaningful changes in the lives of at-risk children (for example, by affecting their likelihood of being placed in special education or remedial classes), overall the magnitude and prevalence of these impacts provide little evidence of widespread harm or substantial benefit from these programs in terms of outcomes measured for younger school-age children.

Where impacts were found for focal children, in two of the states—Florida and Minnesota—the programs had more favorable impacts on young school-age children in more disadvantaged families, such as those with a longer history of welfare receipt or less work experience.³⁷ Conversely, for young school-age children in families least at risk of long-term welfare dependency, those impacts that did occur were negative. In the three other states (Connecticut, Indiana, and Iowa), there was little difference in the pattern of impacts on young school-age children by level of family disadvantage.³⁸

Hypotheses developed within the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes included the possibility that these programs might affect different groups of children differently. For instance, parents with the least amount of previous employment and the most welfare dependency could experience the most difficulty transitioning into employment, resulting in more problematic impacts on their children. Alternatively, these families might benefit most from these programs, since they may be less apt to achieve self-sufficiency on their own, and as a result their children might have the most to gain.

The five studies examined here suggest that, where a pattern of different impacts (that is, differences between experimental group children and control group children) for different subgroups of children was found, the pattern involved more positive impacts on children in more disadvantaged families and more negative

TABLE 4

How the Different State Programs Affected Focal Children's Well-Being: Control Group Levels and Program Impacts Under Each of the Five Welfare Reform Programs

	Florida		Connecticut		Indiana		Iowa ^a		Minnesota ^a	
							Ongoing Recipients	Applicants	Long-Term Recipients	Recent Applicants
	C†	I†	C	I	C	I	C	I	C	I
Education										
Engagement in school (4 items, range from 4 to 12)	10.1	(0.0)	10.6	(0.1)	10.3	(0.0)	10.2	(0.0)	10.6 (-0.4**)	9.9 (0.3**)
Ever repeat a grade since random assignment (%)	24.8	(1.0)	14.7	(1.3)	13.4	(-0.5)	8.2	(-0.5)	6.2 (-3)	4.6 (2.6)
Ever suspended or expelled since random assignment (%)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.5	(0.9)	8.0	(-1.0)	4.9 (2.5)	12.9 (-1.5)
Ever in special education since random assignments (%)	10.1	(2.2)	14	(1.2)	10.7	(2.3)	24.5	(-1.7)	22.4 (-1.7)	22.5 (-4.5)
Performance in school (range from 1 to 5)	4.0	(0.1)	4.2	(-0.0)	4.2	(0.0)	4.0	(0.0)	4.1 (0.1)	4.0 (0.2*)
Social and Emotional Adjustment										
Behavioral Problems Index (BP) total score (28 items, range from 0 to 56)	10.9	(-0.1)	9.2 (-0.9**)		12.0	(-0.5)	12.0	(-0.2)	10.9 (0.4)	12.7 (-1.5*)
BPI externalizing mean score (range from 0 to 2) ⁺	.04	(0.0)	0.3 (-0.0*)		0.5	(-0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	0.2 (0.0)	0.5 (-0.1**)
BPI externalizing mean score (range from 0 to 2) ⁺	.04	(0.0)	0.3 (-0.0**)		0.3	(-0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	0.2 (0.0)	0.4 (-0.1**)
Positive Behavior Scale total score (range from 0 to 70)	60.2	(-1.2*)	60.9	(1.0*)	57.7	(0.3)	57.8	(0.4)	59.0 (-0.3)	57.4 (0.1)
Health and Safety										
In very good or excellent health (%)	73.2	(6.3**)	81.2	(3.3*)	75.7	(0.6)	83.2	(-0.3)	83.0 (0.5)	77.8 (-2.8)
In poor health (%) (Indiana and Iowa report % in fair or poor health) ⁺	6.2	(-2.7**)	4.7	(-1.0)	6.0	(0.2)	3.9	(1.6)	3.5 (-0.1)	7.8 (1.0)
Accident/injury since random assignment (Minnesota Financial Incentives Program asks about any child) (%)	14.3	(0.4)	n/a	n/a	25.5	(-0.6)	32.9	(-0.8)	27.8 (5.8)	36.9 (7.1*)

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

† C: Control group level, I: Program impact

+ Items and scaling may vary by site. See Appendix Table 3 for more details on measures.

^aLong-term recipients and recent applicants in Minnesota are presented separately because the program differed for these two groups. Iowa sample is split into ongoing recipients and applicants because of the length of the intake period in this study. See section III of the text for more detail.

n/a: not available

impacts on children in less disadvantaged families.³⁹ In three of the programs, there were no major differences in the responses to these programs of children in more or less disadvantaged families (see Appendix Tables 14 through 18). Yet in two of the programs (Florida and Minnesota), the few impacts identified were actually more positive for those who were more disadvantaged at the start of the study (e.g., those whose parents had a longer history of welfare receipt or less prior work history), at least for school and behavioral outcomes.⁴⁰ In the few instances in which unfavorable impacts occurred on school and behavioral outcomes in these two programs, they occurred for those in the *less* disadvantaged families.

For example, compared with children whose parents were in the control group, the Minnesota program *increased* the school performance and school engagement of children in the experimental group whose parents were long-term recipients when they entered the study. In contrast, while there were fewer impacts of the program on children in recent-applicant families, the ones that did occur were negative (for instance, the program increased rates of suspensions or expulsions since the start of the study for children in recent-applicant families). Further, the Florida program increased school performance for children whose families were considered most at risk of welfare dependency, while it decreased school performance for those considered least at risk of welfare dependency.

In contrast to the findings for focal children, impacts on adolescents, for whom a more limited number of measures were available (mainly school performance outcomes), were primarily negative.

Because policymakers and researchers were particularly concerned about the effects of welfare reform on the well-being of young children—a group whose mothers were newly mandated to work—in-depth information about adolescents’ development or daily experiences was not collected in the five state studies. These studies also were not designed to collect information from a large number of families with adolescents. Still, emerging evidence showing negative effects for adolescents’ school performance by welfare reform programs merits careful examination of the information that was gathered for an adequate sample of adolescents in four of the five studies.⁴¹ Though many may have assumed that as community norms changed in response to welfare reform, adolescents would respond positively to strong messages of responsibility and to the presence of working parents as role models, increased employment also could have removed parents from their supervisory roles and placed counterproductive demands on youth at a crucial point in their development. To examine how adolescents fared under the four state programs evaluated here, we turn to measures of adolescents’ schooling outcomes—all drawn from parental reports—which primarily address teens’ performance in school. For a couple of programs, information on suspensions, expulsions, and rates of high-school dropout also was collected (see Table 5 for impacts on adolescents).

All four programs had negative impacts on adolescents’ school performance. Some programs reduced the proportion of adolescents performing above average in school whereas others increased the proportion of teens performing below average in school. Yet the negative impacts on school performance were more pronounced for adolescents in the recent-applicant subgroup in the Minnesota program.⁴²

Additionally, of the three programs that reported information about suspensions, one—the Florida program—increased suspensions from 33 to 41 percent, an 8 percentage point increase. The two programs that measured dropping out of school showed no impacts.

The Florida, Connecticut, and Indiana evaluations all include parents’ reports on various items related to teens’ police involvement, arrests, or convictions—although in Connecticut and Florida this information is collected only for the adolescent (and in Florida, the pre-adolescent) siblings of focal children. There were no program impacts on these items for the full sample of adolescents. However, for two small subgroups in Indiana and Florida, teens whose families were in the programs had increased police involvement. And the Connecticut program *reduced* convictions for the adolescent siblings of focal children.

TABLE 5		How the Different State Programs Affected Adolescents' Well-Being ^a : Control Group Levels and Program Impacts Under the Welfare Reform Programs								
	Connecticut		Florida		Indiana		Minnesota ^b			
							Long-Term Recipients		Recent Applicants	
	C†	I†	C	I	C	I	C	I	C	I
Performance in school (Range from 1 to 5)	3.9	(-0.3***)	3.9	(-0.2*)	3.7	(-0.2**)	3.6	(0.0)	3.7	(-0.3**)
Performing above average in school ^c (%)	62.7	(-5.4)	59.7	(-3.6)	34.2	(-6.3*)	38.9	(-11.3*)	36.3	(-12.1**)
Performing below average in school (%)	7.9	(4.8**)	10.9	(3.9)	15.1	(2.8)	23.0	(-1.4)	16.6	(8.3*)
Ever suspended since random assignment date (%)	27.4	(-0.1)	32.7	(8.0**)	33.6	(-3.0)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ever expelled since random assignment date (%)	2.2	(1.6)	5.8	(0.5)	10.3	(0.6)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ever dropped out of school ^d	11.1	(2.7)	n/a	n/a	5.6	(1.9)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ever had or fathered a baby since random assignment date (%)	3.3	(0.9)	3.3	(-0.5)	4.4	(-1.2)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sample Size	1070		741		1126		318		366	

Notes: ***p < .01. **p < .05. *p < .10

Due to small sample sizes and other data concerns, Iowa’s report did not include impacts on adolescents.

†C: Control group level, I: Program impact

^aThe samples of adolescents were drawn from the clients survey sample and represent all the adolescent children of survey respondents. Adolescents in Connecticut, Florida, and Indiana were ages 13 to 17 at the time of the follow-up interview, while those in Minnesota were ages 13 to 21.

^bLong-term recipients and recent applicants in Minnesota are presented separately here because the program differed for these two groups. See section II of the text for more detail.

^cFor Connecticut, Florida, and Minnesota, this captures the percent of students performing very well or well in school. For Indiana, the percent of students performing very well in school is presented.

^dFor Connecticut, the percent who dropped out of school since kindergarten is presented, while for Indiana, the percent who dropped out since Random Assignment is presented.

^eIn Connecticut, the sample size for high-school dropout is 421, since the question was asked only of adolescents over age 16.

n/a: not available

The Florida, Connecticut, and Indiana programs also collected parents' reports about whether their adolescents had borne or fathered a baby. Rates of fertility during the follow-up period among this broad age range of adolescents were low—between 3 and 4 percent—and there were no impacts on this measure in any of the programs.

The findings suggest that welfare reform programs can have negative impacts on adolescents, particularly on their school performance—a result that is similar to what has been found in several other evaluations of welfare-to-work and work-support programs.⁴³ It is noteworthy that these four welfare reform programs detected any impact on adolescents. The fact that any consistent pattern of impacts emerged even though the studies were not designed to measure multiple and important aspects of adolescent development (such as their social behavior, cognitive functioning, rates of delinquency, and involvement with the foster care and juvenile justice systems) warrants the attention of policymakers and researchers alike.

VII. Why Might Impacts on Children Have (or Have Not) Come About in the Five States?

The previous section described the impacts that the five welfare reform programs had on children. We noted that, overall, impacts on focal children were few and small, impacts tended to be more favorable in families with higher levels of disadvantage and unfavorable for families with lower levels of disadvantage, and a pattern of negative impacts was found for adolescents. In this section, we discuss why more impacts were not found for children and why the patterns of impacts that did appear came about.

Why Were There Few Impacts on Children?

In general, these welfare reform programs had few impacts on children approximately three to six years after their parents entered the programs, when children were five to 12-years old. There are a number of reasons why these programs might not have led to more prevalent or larger impacts on focal children.

To begin with, it is possible that changes in children's immediate environments resulting from their parents' assignment to one of these welfare programs were too few or of an insufficient magnitude to lead to widespread long-term impacts on children's well-being. For instance, impacts on parenting and children's home environments were not widespread in these studies, and those impacts that did occur may not have been large enough to substantially affect children's well-being.

Alternatively, these programs may have had earlier impacts on children's environments that were not sustained long enough to affect children's well-being. The measures of family environment examined in these studies are all taken from the end of the follow-up period and do not show widespread impacts on children's home environments. Yet these programs might have had larger or more pervasive impacts on these environments—or on the children themselves—closer to the start

of the study, as families experienced initial changes in their daily lives as a result of the program. However, these initial changes could have faded over time as families adjusted to their new circumstances, leading to few lasting impacts on children's well-being. Indeed, an evaluation of the JOBS program suggests that the impacts of welfare reform programs on children may fade, or change, over time.⁴⁴

There may also have been important long-term changes in children's immediate environments, but impacts may have been both favorable and unfavorable, with such offsetting impacts leading to no net impacts on children, or very few small net impacts. For instance, it is possible that the same program could lead to both increases in family income and increases in family stress (for instance, if a parent is unhappy in a new job) and that these two changes in children's environments could serve to cancel each other out when it comes to children's well-being.

Where Impacts Were Found, Why Did They Come About?

While impacts on the focal children in these five programs were relatively few, an important question remains about why the impacts that did occur fell into the patterns that they did. Unfortunately, the statistical analyses necessary to understand why these programs had impacts on children have yet to be conducted. What we have done, however, is compare how these programs did or did not affect the targeted and non-targeted outcomes, and examine whether this pattern of impacts occurred in a direction consistent with the impacts on children. This is a rough method for determining why the patterns of impacts for children occurred, but it provides some insight into how these programs' impacts on children's environments compared to their impacts on children's well-being. We discuss how the patterns of impacts on children within the programs line up with impacts on targeted and non-targeted variables.

The welfare reform programs in two states with the most consistent positive impacts on focal children—Connecticut and Minnesota—also increased family income. The program in Florida increased family income more modestly and had neutral, rather than positive, impacts on children. Benefits to children appear to occur when the increases in income are substantial.

As described earlier, impacts on income varied across the five state studies, largely due to differences in program rules. Programs with generous earned income disregards generally increased income, although in some cases these impacts were concentrated in particular subgroups or at particular points during the follow-up period. In all cases, increases in income occurred in the context of increases in employment for parents.

While negative impacts on adolescents occurred in both programs that increased income and those that did not, positive impacts for the younger focal children appeared to co-occur with increases in income for families. While there were few impacts for focal children overall, positive impacts were found when parents had increases in household income of approximately \$100 per month for at least part of the follow-up period. That benefits occur when parents increase both their

employment and their income is consistent with nonexperimental research on the effects of income and poverty on children.⁴⁵ Increases in income of this magnitude and benefits to children (although not found for all subgroups of families) were observed only in programs with generous earnings disregards. We describe these patterns of impacts below.

Consistent positive impacts on children were found in the Minnesota program, but only for children of long-term welfare recipients (not for children of recent applicants). For children of long-term welfare recipients, Minnesota's program improved children's schooling and behavioral outcomes. Interestingly, only for these families did Minnesota's program increase income substantially—by about \$1,300 a year for a three-year period. In this same program, for recent applicants, impacts on income were non-significant and impacts on children were generally neutral, suggesting a consistent association in this study between impacts on income and positive impacts on children.

Minnesota's program was evaluated using a three-group research design that helps disentangle the relationship between program components, impacts on income and employment, and impacts on children's developmental outcomes. Families in this study were randomly assigned to either 1) the full program; 2) a program group members of which were eligible to receive generous supplements to their earnings, but not mandated to participate in employment-related activities (called Incentives Only); or 3) the control group.⁴⁶ The Incentives Only program increased the proportion of parents who were working, but because some parents cut back on their work effort and many were induced by the financial incentive to work only part-time, there was no impact on earnings. Most importantly, the Incentives Only program increased income among long-term welfare recipients. By comparison, the full program, with the addition of the mandate to participate in employment, increased full-time employment more so than the Incentives Only program, but did not increase income further. The comparison of the impacts of the Incentives Only program and the full program provides a direct test of the addition of a mandate to an earnings supplement program.

While the Incentives Only program resulted in benefits to children's achievement and behavioral outcomes, there were no further improvements to children from the addition of the mandate. The positive impacts observed were due to the incentives (the earnings supplements) and not to the addition of the mandate. These findings suggest that the addition of the mandate, and the increased employment it generated, did not further improve children's well-being beyond that of the Incentives Only program.

In Connecticut, income increases in the first and second years of the study before participants had reached the time limit were as substantial as in Minnesota (about \$1,200 in the first year and about \$1,100 in the second year), but the increases were not sustained over the follow-up period. Impacts on children were positive as well, one year after the impacts on income had faded. Connecticut's program had positive impacts on both children's behavioral and health outcomes. These findings indicate that benefits to children may occur even when income is increased only in the early part of the follow-up period.⁴⁷

In Florida and Indiana, income impacts, when found, were modest compared to those in Connecticut and Minnesota (for long-term recipients); at the same time, few and mixed impacts were found for children. Florida's program increased income on average by about \$500, with increases of about \$700 in the middle two years of the four-year follow-up. Indiana's program did not increase average annual income, as parents' increased earnings were offset by their loss of welfare benefits.

Finally, Iowa's program substantially decreased total household income for applicants in the month prior to the survey, and school engagement decreased for children in this group.

Impacts on children's environments—with the exception of child care—varied in size and direction across programs. Yet the impacts that did occur in at least two programs were consistent in direction with impacts that occurred on the child outcomes for focal children.

The information available about program impacts on child care do not suggest that increased participation in child care led to program impacts on child well-being. More specifically, nearly all of the programs increased children's participation in child care, especially formal care, but not all of the programs affected children's well-being. Minnesota's, Florida's, and Indiana's programs each increased formal care over the follow-up period, yet impacts on young school-age children's outcomes differed substantially, with benefits on children's outcomes in Minnesota but no impact on these outcomes in Florida or Indiana. Some other aspect of parents' and children's lives, besides child care, may be important in influencing program impacts on children's outcomes.

However, it could also be possible that differences in program impacts on quality, duration, and extent of care matter most in determining program impacts on children's outcomes (and these aspects of care are not measured comprehensively in these studies), or that it is some combination of program impacts on child care and other aspects of these children's lives that together influence their well-being.⁴⁸ For example, Minnesota's program increased children's participation in formal care, reduced maternal experiences with domestic abuse, and increased parental supervision. All of these impacts may have jointly contributed to Minnesota's favorable effects on children's achievement and behavior.

The link between program impacts on family life and program impacts on children's outcomes is tenuous, but two patterns emerge that are consistent with a priori hypotheses of how children's outcomes could be affected. The reductions in maternal reports of domestic abuse, increased parental monitoring and supervision, and reductions in maternal depression (in Minnesota's Incentives Only program) for single-mother long-term recipients in Minnesota are all in a direction that are predicted to improve children's well-being, and indeed, favorable impacts were found on children's school achievement and problem behavior. Connecticut's program reduced harsh parenting and, though no impacts were found on children's cognitive outcomes, the program improved children's behavior. Finally, Iowa's program appeared to increase maternal reports of domestic abuse.

The patterns of impacts for more and less disadvantaged subgroups in Florida and Minnesota also follow this pattern, with impacts on aspects of family processes showing the same pattern as found for child outcomes—more positive impacts for more disadvantaged families and more negative impacts for less disadvantaged families. For instance, the full Minnesota program decreased domestic violence, increased marriage, and increased parental supervision for long-term recipients, while it had none of these favorable impacts—and in fact increased harsh parenting—for recent applicants. Likewise, while the Florida program had few impacts on non-targeted outcomes, those that were found were in the unfavorable direction for families least at risk of welfare dependency (involving slight decreases in family routines and parental supervision), while more positive impacts were found for families most at risk of welfare dependency (with slight increases in family routines and the home physical environment).

While these patterns seem convincing, it is also important to note that programs can affect family life in ways that are predicted to affect children’s well-being without affecting child outcomes. As in Minnesota, Indiana’s program decreased maternal depressive symptoms and parental aggravation, yet unlike in Minnesota, Indiana’s program produced no impact on children’s outcomes.

It is unclear why these programs had some negative impacts on adolescents.

As noted above, where program impacts were found for adolescents, they were primarily negative. How and why these programs affected adolescents negatively is unclear at this point, particularly since impacts on the targeted and non-targeted outcomes for the parents of adolescents have not been systematically examined. Hypotheses as to why pilot welfare-reform programs may negatively affect adolescents focus on the role of increased parental employment and the resulting implications for low-income teenagers of decreased parental supervision, increased adult-like responsibilities, and decreased quality of relationships with parents.⁴⁹ More research is needed to provide evidence in support of these and other potential hypotheses.

VIII. Levels of Well-Being Among the Children and Families in the Five States

So far, this report has focused almost exclusively on the *impact* of pilot welfare-reform programs on children’s families and well-being—that is, a comparison of outcomes for the program group versus the control group. Yet an important way to understand these impacts is by considering the *levels* of adjustment among the families in the control group, that is, how the children and families would function in the absence of the welfare-reform programs. In this section, we discuss the average levels of well-being of children and families in the control group, comparing these levels to information available on the average levels of well-being among families nationally.

Before proceeding with this discussion, we issue some caveats about these comparisons. First, the five states included in this report are not representative of all

of the states in our nation. In fact, in three of the five states—Connecticut, Iowa, and Minnesota—children tend to rank well above the national average on indicators of children’s well-being.⁵⁰ Hence, the levels of well-being found for the children in these programs are not likely to be representative of those for children in all families receiving welfare nationwide. Second, we are limited to the handful of measures in these studies that are found in national studies of children or families. Third, we are limited to parents’ reports of young school-age children’s educational outcomes, behavioral and emotional well-being, and health and safety. However, prior research suggests that evidence of lower levels of well-being for children in families receiving welfare (compared with national samples) is more pronounced for direct assessments of cognitive skills than for parents’ reports of children’s behavioral problems or general health status.⁵¹

Apart from any program impacts, the children in these families are experiencing multiple stressors, including high levels of economic disadvantage, depressive symptoms in parents, and domestic violence. The average levels of well-being among the focal children themselves, where different from those of national samples of children (such as in health and behavioral problems), tended to look worse.

Given that the samples in the five state evaluations are comprised of families that were recently receiving welfare, these are clearly economically disadvantaged families. There are also some signs that these families have high levels of disadvantage beyond having low income. Overall, rates of depressive symptoms suggestive of clinical depression among control group parents in the focal child sample are higher than those typically found in community samples, which is closer to 20 percent for women.⁵² For instance, the percent of parents found to be at risk for depression was 41 percent in Indiana and 50 percent in Connecticut.⁵³

Similarly, these parents experienced elevated levels of domestic abuse. National estimates suggest that about a quarter of all women have ever experienced domestic violence, and less than two percent have experienced it in the recent past (within the past year).⁵⁴ Rates of domestic abuse are considerably higher in these samples, ranging from 36 percent in Connecticut to nearly 60 percent in Indiana since random assignment (2.5 years to 6.5 years prior to the interview).

For the four indicators of children’s well-being (all reported by the parent and concentrated on the focal children) for which comparable national data were available, the levels of well-being among these young school-age children tended to be slightly worse than those for national samples of children, although this was not always the case for each indicator within each state.

For instance, the control group levels on a short version of the Behavior Problems Index—a widely used maternal report measure of children’s behavioral problems—ranged between about 11 and 13 (out of a possible 56) for focal children in most of these samples, whereas a national sample of five to 12-year-olds had an average score of nine.⁵⁵ While about 75 percent of the parents in these five states reported that their focal children were in very good or excellent health, this was somewhat lower than the figure for a national sample of children aged five to 12

(83 percent).⁵⁶ In addition, a greater proportion of focal children were rated as being in poor health in the three states that included this measure, with a range of just under five percent (in Connecticut) to almost eight percent (for long-term recipients in Minnesota); this compares to less than one percent in a national sample of children of comparable age.⁵⁷

Levels of school engagement among these children followed a different pattern, ranging from somewhat higher than those for a national sample of children to quite a bit lower.⁵⁸ Compared to 43 percent of children in a national sample rated by their parents as highly engaged in school, between 44 and 56 percent of control group focal children in Minnesota and Connecticut were rated as such. Yet only 10 percent of focal children in Florida were rated as highly engaged.

In sum, the control group families in these programs seem to be more disadvantaged, on average, than families in the nation as a whole—particularly with regard to levels of domestic violence and maternal depressive symptoms. The levels of well-being of the young school-age children, where different from those for a national sample of children, also tended to be worse, especially concerning measures of behavioral adjustment and health.⁵⁹

IX. Conclusion

The Project on State-Level Child Outcomes was initiated to understand whether and how pilot welfare reform programs launched in five states—Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota—affected children. In general, the five state programs achieved their policy goals for adults. They increased parental employment, earnings, and in some cases, household income, though these increases were not always substantial or sustained. Yet overall, the programs had few and small impacts on young school-age children. In contrast, impacts of the programs on adolescents were more frequent and were primarily negative, though a more limited number of outcomes was examined for these older children. These findings are consistent with those reported in other syntheses of welfare reform evaluations and provide additional support for four important patterns emerging from the literature.⁶⁰

First, consistent with previously reported findings, the programs with the most positive impacts on outcomes for young school-age children—the Minnesota program (for long-term recipients only) and the Connecticut program—also increased family income. Yet this pattern did not hold in all cases: The Florida program increased average family income over the follow-up period, albeit more modestly, but did not have positive impacts on children. These findings point to the potential importance of generous financial incentives, such as earnings disregards, that can increase both employment and income for welfare recipients. More research is needed, however, to better specify the circumstances under which increased parental employment and income can produce benefits for children.

Second, while the programs had few impacts on aspects of family life important to children (stability and turbulence, the home environment,

parenting, and parents' psychological well-being), the impacts that did occur appeared to be consistent in direction with impacts that occurred for young school-age children. Thus, programs have the potential to change aspects of children's daily environments in ways that may have implications for their developmental outcomes. However, there does not appear to be a single pathway through which children are affected in these programs. Instead of one specific aspect of family life appearing to be important, the findings suggest that when changes in one or more of a broader set of family variables occur, these tend to correspond to the direction of impacts for children.

Third, in two of the states—Florida and Minnesota—a pattern of more favorable impacts for children in more disadvantaged families was found. Conversely, for young school-age children in families *least* at risk of long-term welfare dependency in these states, those impacts that did occur were negative. These findings highlight the need to ascertain how a family's unique circumstances intersects with welfare program requirements to facilitate (or inhibit) their achievement of program goals. Program strategies addressing the various stressors in families' lives, such as divorce or the birth of a child, in addition to focusing on aspects of job readiness, may provide more comprehensive support to families transitioning into or out of welfare.⁶¹

Finally, we see a pattern of primarily negative impacts for adolescents. Specifically, in four of the state programs, adolescents' school performance was negatively affected. This pattern warrants further attention from both researchers and policymakers.

The four patterns noted here provide important avenues for further research to help us understand *how* and *why* welfare programs affect children. Many unanswered questions remain that are important to pursue. For example, the unfavorable findings for adolescents highlight the fact that welfare programs may have distinct implications for children of different ages. Furthermore, the programs presented here and those that are analyzed in the broader literature provide very little information on a wider range of outcomes for adolescents and virtually no information on how infants and toddlers are faring in the context of welfare reform.⁶² It will be useful in the future to investigate how welfare reform affects these and other key populations of children, for example, children of immigrants and children with disabilities. Finally, the programs discussed in this report emerged from unique social, economic, and policy contexts. New patterns of findings are likely to be found when a more comprehensive range of policies and economic conditions are examined.

In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that, on average, the children studied in these evaluations are experiencing high levels of economic disadvantage and their parents are experiencing high levels of depressive symptoms and domestic violence. Even when favorable program impacts on children were found, children remained at risk for poor development. Moreover, the several unfavorable impacts identified for children and adolescents may indicate further elevations in already high levels of risk. Thus, while children were not generally worse off as a result of the welfare policies evaluated in these five studies, the fact that young school-age

children didn't experience widespread improvements in their lives, and that adolescents experienced some unfavorable impacts, underscores the need for strategies to reduce the high risk levels of low-income families involved with state welfare programs.

Endnotes

¹ Child Trends. (2000). *Children and welfare reform: A guide to evaluating the effects of state welfare policies on children*. Washington DC: Child Trends.

² Zaslow, M.J., Moore, K.A., Morrison, D.R., & Coiro, M.J. (1995). The Family Support Act and children: Potential pathways of influence. *Children and Youth Services Review*, 17, 19-34.

³ Le Menstrel, S., Tout, K., McGroder, S., Zaslow, M., & Moore, K.A. (1999). *An overview and synthesis of the project on state-level child outcomes*. Washington, DC: Child Trends.

⁴ The findings from three of the evaluations examined in this report (Connecticut, Indiana, and Iowa) have not appeared previously in other syntheses of the literature. Findings from Florida and Minnesota have been described in other summary reports.

⁵ Morris, P., Huston, A., Duncan G., Crosby, D., & Bos, J. (2001). *How welfare and work policies affect children: A synthesis of research*. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.; Zaslow, M., Moore, K., Brooks, J., Morris, P., Tout, K., Redd, Z., & Emig, C. (2002). Experimental studies of welfare reform and children. *The Future of Children*, 12(1), 79-96.

⁶ Child Trends, 2000.; Moore, K.A., Zaslow, M.J., Coiro, M.J., Miller, S., & Magenheimer, E. (1995). *How well are they faring? AFDC families with preschool-aged children in Atlanta at the outset of the JOBS Evaluation*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Zaslow et al., 1995. Another early conceptualization of how welfare reform might affect children was Wilson, J.B., Ellwood, D.T., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (1995). Welfare-to-work through the eyes of children. In L. Chase-Lansdale and J. Brooks-Gunn (Eds.), *Escape from poverty: what makes a difference for children?* New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁷ Because parents of infants were not targeted by welfare reform in the early 1990s, information on impacts for infants was not generated by these evaluations.

⁸ See Le Menestrel et al., 1999.

⁹ In Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Minnesota, respondents in the focal child sample completed both the Client Survey and the Focal Child Survey in their homes. In Iowa, respondents in the focal child sample completed the Client Survey by telephone and the Focal Child Survey in their homes.

¹⁰ The adolescents in this sample were either siblings of focal children or were in families that did not have a focal child. For those adolescents who were siblings of focal children, information about the family environment was available from the Focal Child Survey.

¹¹ To maximize comparability of the measures across the five evaluations, some measures were constructed that did not appear originally or that differ slightly from those appearing in the individual state reports. The variations in the measures are minor.

¹² In all but one of these studies, analyses of the effects of programs on children focus exclusively on children of parents who were single at the beginning of the study. This policy, however, could change the incentive for that parent to marry while receiving AFDC benefits.

¹³ It is important to note that this section describes programs as they were experienced by the study samples during the demonstration period. The states implemented somewhat different programs under TANF, so these are not accurate descriptions of current state programs.

¹⁴ An adult recipient was exempted from the time limit (and the mandatory activities) if he or she was 60 years old or older; incapacitated or caring full time for an incapacitated household member; pregnant or postpartum if a physician determined that she was unable to work; a caretaker relative who was not included in the welfare grant; or unemployable. Recipients were considered unemployable if they were 40 or older, had not completed grade 6, and had not worked for more than six consecutive months in the past five years. Exemptions for employability were not determined until the participant had received benefits for 20 months.

¹⁵ In July 2000, Indiana substantially increased the generosity of its earnings disregard. All income for program group members is disregarded until a family reaches the federal poverty level.

¹⁶ Participants with very low earnings (total earnings of less than \$1,200 in the prior 12 months) were eligible for the Work Transition Program, which allowed a disregard of all earned income in the first four months of work. This program ended in 1997.

- ¹⁷ In 1996, the exemption period following the birth of a child was shortened to three months.
- ¹⁸ In the other states, formal care payments often were made directly to the provider. However, in those state programs, payments were made in the same way for both the new welfare-reform program group and the AFDC group. In this case, payments were made directly to providers for both formal and informal arrangements and this form of payment was not available in all cases for the AFDC group.
- ¹⁹ Bloom, D., Farrell, M., & Fink, B. (2002). *Welfare time limits: State policies, implementation and effects on families*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
- ²⁰ Data from the State Policy Documentation Project, accessed online at <http://www.spdp.org/tanf/financial/earndisreg.pdf>
- ²¹ Data from the State Policy Documentation Project, accessed online at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/sanctions_overview.pdf
- ²² Because some of the numbers in Table 2 are for a broader sample than families with focal children, program impacts specific to the focal child sample may be somewhat different. Where possible, attempts were made to verify that impacts were consistent across samples.
- ²³ Hamilton, G., Freedman, S., Gennetian, L., Michalopoulos, C., Walter, J., Adams-Ciardullo, D., Gassman-Pines, A., McGroder, S., Zaslow, M., Brooks, J., & Ahluwalia, S. (2002). *National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: How effective are different welfare-to-work approaches? Five-year adult and child impacts for eleven programs*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families and Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, and U.S. Department of Education.
- ²⁴ Although employment impact estimates were larger for relatively disadvantaged subgroups, the difference in impacts between more and less disadvantaged subgroups was not necessarily statistically significant.
- ²⁵ The survey measure of household income is for a point in time between three and six years after random assignment, depending on when the survey was administered in each state. See Appendix Table 2 for the timing of the survey in each state.
- ²⁶ Additionally, Iowa's welfare reform program originally included a Work Transition Program (WTP), which provided a full disregard of all earned income during the first four months of employment to program members who had earnings of less than \$1,200 over the previous year. The program proved difficult to administer and some participants complained they had not received benefits for which they were eligible. In 1997, the WTP was eliminated.
- ²⁷ McGroder, S.M., Zaslow, M.J., Moore, K.A., & Le Menestrel, S. (2000). *National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: Impacts on young children and their families two years after enrollment: findings from the Child Outcomes Study*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families and Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and U.S. Department of Education, Office of the Under Secretary and Office of Vocational and Adult Education; Tout, K., Zaslow, M., Papillo, A., & Vandivere, S. (2001). Early care and education: Work support for families and developmental opportunity for young children. *Assessing the new federalism*. Occasional paper (No. 51). Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
- ²⁸ Most of the individual state studies examine other aspects of child care such as duration and stability, but these are not discussed in this report. Parents also assessed the quality of the focal child's primary arrangement, but because these impacts are not experimental, they are not presented here.
- ²⁹ The time periods for "ever any" care (any child care, any formal care, and any self care) varied across the studies. In Florida, the time period for "ever any child care" covered months 38 to 49 of the follow-up period (roughly, the fourth year of follow-up), while the time period for "ever any formal care" and "ever any self care" covered the two years prior to the survey. In Minnesota, the time period covered approximately three years (from random assignment to the program). In Iowa, Connecticut, and Indiana, the time period for all of the "ever any" care measures covered the two years prior to the survey.
- ³⁰ The increase in self care in Connecticut was found for older focal children (9 to 12-year-olds). On average, children in Connecticut experienced self care—was three to four hours per week.
- ³¹ A positive impact on total household income in the month prior to the survey – the time period directly corresponding to the measure of formal care—was found in Connecticut for the *full child sample*. Impacts on this measure were not available for subgroups.
- ³² Connecticut's Jobs-First program also improved reports of neighborhood conditions.
- ³³ It is difficult to predict how changes in family formation affect stability and turbulence in a child's life without understanding who is and has been in the household and the relationship of the new spouse or noncustodial parent to the child.

³⁴ Radloff, L.S. (1977). The CES.D Scale: A self-report depression scale for research in the general population. *Applied Psychological Measurement*, 1, 285-401. A second MFIP program—the MFIP Incentives Only group (described later in this report)—also decreased parental depression. See the original report for details.

³⁵ Effect sizes in this report refer to the size of the difference between the control and program groups divided by the standard deviation of the control group.

³⁶ Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences* (2nd edition). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum and Associates.

³⁷ Our conclusions regarding subgroup patterns are based on both the impacts presented in this report (i.e., impacts on measures that were available across most or all of the five studies), as well as on information from the final reports for each of these five evaluations. For instance, while Appendix Table 15 shows only small differences in the impacts on children in more and less disadvantaged families, stronger evidence of such a pattern is available in the full report (Bloom et al., 2000).

³⁸ Appendix Table 16 suggests there were some favorable impacts on children in the least disadvantaged families in Indiana (those with greater work histories), although these impacts were not always statistically different from impacts for children in more disadvantaged families. Further, there is some limited evidence of negative impacts in Iowa on children in ongoing-recipient families whose parents were more disadvantaged educationally at the start of the program (see Appendix Table 17). Since this pattern was not found for applicants with less education at the start of the program or for those with less work history at the start of the program, the finding is considered more tentative. Later work for this project will focus on defining disadvantage similarly across the five evaluations and will further explore the patterns in Iowa and Indiana.

³⁹ “Disadvantage” has been defined slightly differently across the evaluations, but this definition generally focuses on those with a longer history of welfare receipt, those already receiving welfare at the start of the study, or those with less prior work experience at the start of the study (see the individual reports for definitions of these subgroups).

⁴⁰ We remind the reader that we are discussing program impacts on children, not the levels of well-being of the children. In all three of these studies, children in “less disadvantaged” families showed higher levels of well-being than those in “more disadvantaged” families. The result of this pattern of more positive impacts on more disadvantaged children and more negative impacts on less disadvantaged children is that the levels of well-being in these two groups of children look more similar as a result of the program than they would have in its absence.

⁴¹ The sample sizes and age ranges at the time of the follow-up for each study are: Minnesota, 318 adolescents in long-term recipient families and 366 adolescents in recent applicant families ages 13 to 21 years; Florida, 741 adolescents ages 13 to 17 years; Connecticut, 1,070 adolescents ages 13 to 17 years; Indiana, 1,126 adolescents ages 13 to 17 years. While information on adolescents was collected in Iowa, the sample sizes were deemed too small to provide reliable estimates of impacts.

⁴² Comparable subgroup analyses were not systematically conducted for the other states.


⁴³ Brooks, J., Hair, E., & Zaslow, M. (2001). *Welfare reform's impact on adolescents: Early warning signs* (Research Brief) Washington, DC: Child Trends; Bos, H., Huston, A.C., Granger, R., Duncan, G., Brock, T., & McLoyd, V. (1999). *New hope for people with low incomes: Two year results of a program to reduce poverty and reform welfare*. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation; Gennetian, Lisa A., Duncan, G., Knox, V., Vargas, W., Clark-Kauffman, E., & London, A. (2002). *How welfare and work policies for parents affect adolescents: A synthesis of research*. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation; Hamilton, G., Freedman, S., Gennetian, L., Michalopoulos, C., Walter, J., Adams-Ciardullo, D., Gassman-Pines, A., McGroder, S., Zaslow, M., Brooks, J., & Ahluwalia, S. (2002). *National evaluation of welfare-to-work strategies: How effective are different welfare-to-work approaches? Five-year adult and child impacts for eleven programs*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families and Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, and U.S. Department of Education; Morris, P., & Michalopoulos, C. (2000). *The self sufficiency project at 36 months: Effects on children of a program that increased parental employment and income*. Ottawa, Canada: Social Research and Demonstration Corporation;

⁴⁴ McGroder, S.M., Zaslow, M.J., Moore, K.A., & Brooks, J.L. (2002). *Impacts of a mandatory welfare-to-work program on children at school entry and beyond: Findings from the NEWWS child outcomes study*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

⁴⁵ Duncan, G.J., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (1997). *Consequences of growing up poor*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- ⁴⁶ See the individual evaluation report for more details on Minnesota's three-group research design.
- ⁴⁷ When examining the findings presented in the individual Minnesota and Connecticut reports, it appears as if benefits to children were more pervasive across outcomes in Minnesota as compared with Connecticut. However, limiting the comparison to the measures selected for this report, a similar number of positive impacts were observed in the two programs.
- ⁴⁸ The most likely scenario is that program effects on child care and other positive aspects of children's lives were reinforcing each other. For example, increased formal care may have contributed to positive effects on children's achievement, but so could have increased supervision or less harsh parenting. Analyses necessary to isolate the effects of any one of these outcomes have not yet been conducted.
- ⁴⁹ Brooks et al., 2001; Gennetian, L., G. Duncan, V. Knox, W. Vargas and E. Clarke-Kauffman. (2002). *How welfare and work policies affect adolescents: Key findings from a systematic synthesis of eight experimental studies*. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
- ⁵⁰ Annie E. Casey Foundation (2001). *Kids Count Databook: State profiles of child well-being*. Baltimore, MD: Annie E. Casey Foundation.
- ⁵¹ McGroder, et al., 2000;
- ⁵² Devins and Orme propose that individuals scoring 16 or higher on the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) scale are at "high risk" for clinical depression. While most of these studies used the same cutoff based on a cutoff for the full CES-D Scale suggestive of clinical depression (16 out of 60), MFIP defined "high risk" as a score of 23 or higher.
- ⁵³ See note 52. Devins, G. M., & Orme, C. M. (1985). Center for epidemiological studies depression scale. In D. J. Keyser & R. C. Sweetland (Eds.), *Test critiques* (pp. 144-160). Kansas City, MO: Test Corporation of America.
- ⁵⁴ Tjaden, P., & Thoennes, N. (2000). *Extent, nature, and consequences of intimate partner violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
- ⁵⁵ Based on Child Trends analysis of the National Survey of America's Families (1997) for 5-to 12-year-olds.
- ⁵⁶ Based on Child Trends analysis of the National Survey of America's Families (1997) for 5-to 12-year-olds.
- ⁵⁷ Based on Child Trends analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort for 5-to 12-year-olds in 1999.
- ⁵⁸ The scaling for school engagement that was used in the welfare studies differs somewhat from that used in the National Survey of America's Families (1997).
- ⁵⁹ Annie E Casey Foundation, 2001.
- ⁶⁰ See Morris et al., 2001; Sherman, A. (2002). *How children fare in welfare experiments appears to hinge on income*. Washington, DC: Children's Defense Fund.; Zaslow, M. et al. (2002).
- ⁶¹ Zaslow, M., Brooks, J., Moore, K., Morris, P., Tout, K. and Redd, Z. *Impact on children in experimental studies of welfare-to-work programs*. (2001). Washington DC: Child Trends.
- ⁶² Early Head Start Research and Evaluation Project (2001). *Building their futures: How Early Head Start programs are enhancing the lives of infants and toddlers in low-income families, Summary Report*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration on Children, Youth, and Families, Head Start Bureau and The Commissioner's Office on Research and Evaluation.

Appendix Figure 1. Time Period of Random Assignment^a, Client Survey, and Child Well-Being Survey for the Five State Programs



^a Periods of random assignment are presented for the focal child sample only. In Florida and Minnesota, random assignment spanned a longer period of time for the full administrative sample (see Appendix Table 1 for more details).

**Appendix Table 1. Sample Descriptions for the Five State Programs:
Administrative, Client, and Focal Child Survey Samples**

Program	Description of Sample ^a	Period of Random Assignment ^b	Sites	Follow-Up Survey
Connecticut Jobs First Program (See Appendix Tables 4, 9, 14)	<u>Eligible Sample:</u> Single parents applying for or receiving welfare from one of two Connecticut welfare offices during period of random assignment. <u>Full Administrative Sample:</u> 4,803 single parents randomly assigned from the Eligible Sample.	January 1996 to February 1997	New Haven and Manchester	Three years after random assignment
	<u>Client Survey Sample:</u> 2,424 single parents from the Full Administrative Sample. <u>Focal Child Sample:</u> 1,469 single-parent families from the Client Survey Sample All focal children had to be between the ages of 5 and 12 at the time of the Client Survey.	April 1996 to February 1997		
Florida Family Transition Program (See Appendix tables 5, 10, 15)	<u>Eligible Sample:</u> Individuals applying for or receiving cash assistance (5,430 randomly assigned) (Groups exempt from study before random assignment: incapacitated or disabled adults, individuals under 18 attending school or working 30+ hours/week, adults caring full-time for disabled dependents, parents caring for children 6 months old or younger who were conceived before the beginning of FTP; individuals 62 years or older; caretaker relatives whose needs are not included in the grant. Person could be assigned at a future recertification interview).	May 1994 to October 1996	Escambia County	Four years after random assignment ^c
	<u>Full Administrative Sample:</u> 2,817 randomly assigned single parent cases from the Eligible Sample.	May 1994 to February 1995		
	<u>Client Survey Sample:</u> 1,729 single parents from the Full Administrative Sample.	August 1994 to February 1995		
	<u>Focal Child Sample:</u> 1,108 single-parent families from the Client Survey Sample All focal children had to be between the ages of 5 and 12 at the time of the Client Survey.			

^a See original reports for more detailed information about samples and sampling design.

^b For Minnesota's Financial Incentives Program and Florida's Family Transition Program, the child study samples were drawn from families randomly assigned during a specific period of the full random assignment period for the adult samples. Therefore, the period of Random Assignment for the full administrative sample and for the focal child sample differ.

^c Subsample follow-up studies: post-time-limit survey (n=237) beginning May 1997 (6-, 12-, and 18-month follow-ups); two-year client survey targeted to 750 people randomly assigned between December 1994 and February 1995.

Appendix Table 1. (Continued)

Program	Description of Sample^a	Period of Random Assignment^b	Sites	Follow-Up Survey
Indiana Welfare Reform Program (See Appendix Tables 6, 11, 16)	<u>Eligible Sample:</u> All single-parent families who applied for or received welfare during the period of random assignment.	May 1995 to April 1996	All 92 counties in Indiana	Five years after random assignment
	<u>Full Administrative Sample:</u> 66,440 single-parent families (63,223 assigned to the Welfare Reform Group, and 3,217 to the traditional welfare group).			
	<u>Client Survey Sample:</u> 2,359 single-parent from the Full Administrative Sample. The Client Survey Sample consisted of both applicant and continuing recipients of AFDC and Indiana's welfare reform benefits.			
	<u>Focal Child Sample:</u> 1,679 from the Client Survey Sample. All focal children had to be between the ages of 5 and 12 at the time of the Client Survey.			
Iowa Family Investment Program (See Appendix Tables 7, 12, 17)	<u>Eligible Sample:</u> Ongoing FIP Cases (heads of welfare cases who were receiving welfare on September 1993); applicant FIP cases: (individuals who applied for FIP during the period of random assignment).	September 1993 to March 1996	Nine counties in Iowa, including a mix of urban and rural counties and representation of the five DHS administrative regions. Black Hawk, Linn, Polk, Pottawattamie, and Woodbury are urban counties representing each of the five regions. Clinton, Des Moines, Jackson, and Jones are four rural counties from the Cedar Rapids administrative region.	2.5 to 6.5 years after random assignment
	<u>Full Administrative Sample:</u> 17,345 heads of welfare cases (consisting of 7,418 ongoing cases and 9,927 applicant cases).			
	<u>Client Survey Sample:</u> 2,951 heads of welfare cases from the full administrative sample, including 1,413 ongoing cases and 1,538 applicant cases.			
	<u>Focal Child Sample:</u> 1,475 from the Client Survey Sample, including 813 applicant cases and 662 ongoing cases. All focal children had to be between the ages of 5 and 12 at the time of the Client Survey.			

Appendix Table 1. (Continued)

Program	Description of Sample ^a	Period of Random Assignment ^b	Sites	Follow-Up Survey
Minnesota Family Investment Program (See Appendix Tables 8, 13, 18)	<u>Eligible Sample:</u> Individuals applying for or receiving welfare (cash assistance in urban counties, cash assistance or Food Stamps in rural counties) during enrollment period, were at least 18 years old, and lived in one of the seven evaluation counties; families in which all parents received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) were excluded.	April 1994 to March 1996	3 urban counties: Hennepin, Anoka, Dakota; 4 rural counties: Mille Lacs, Morrison, Sherburne, Todd	Three years after random assignment
	<u>Full Administrative Sample:</u> 11,473 individuals applying for or receiving welfare (did not include those with missing baseline information, families only receiving Food Stamps, or AFDC/no service families from Hennepin County). ■ <u>9,217 single-parent families:</u> - <u>Long-term recipients (3,208)</u> had received welfare for 24 months or more of the past 36 months when entered program; participation in employment-focused services was immediately mandatory (except if had a child under age 1, had other "good cause" reasons, or were working 30+ hours per week). - <u>Recent applicants (6,009)</u> applying for welfare or had been receiving benefits for less than 2 years when entered program; participation in employment-focused services was mandatory when received welfare for 24 months. ■ <u>2,256 two-parent families:</u> ^d - <u>Recipients (1,523)</u> had received welfare for at least one month--For those assigned to MFIP who had been on welfare for 6 of the past 12 months, participation in employment-focused services was immediately mandatory; otherwise, participants were subject when they reached 6-month mark (except if had a child under age 1, had other "good cause" reasons, if 1 parent was incapacitated, or were working 30+ hours per week). - <u>Applicants (733)</u> applying for welfare; participation in employment-focused services was mandatory when received welfare for 6 months.			
	<u>Client Survey Sample:</u> 3,245 families from the Full Administrative Sample (2,837 single-parent families, 408 two-parent families).			
	<u>Focal Child Sample:</u> 1,531 urban, single-parent families selected from the Client Survey Sample. Focal child had to be 5 to 12 years old at the time of the client survey follow-up interview, predetermined before first interview, legal child of respondent, and lived with respondent at some time during past 3 months and for at least 2 days during the past week. Total focal child sample included 879 long-term recipients and 652 recent recipients.	April 1, 1994, to October 31, 1994	Focal child study sites include Hennepin, Anoka and Dakota	

^d Two-parent families that included a step-parent were subject to the same program requirements as the single-parent (not the two-parent) families.

Appendix Table 2. Age of Focal Children and Adolescents as of Random Assignment and the Follow-Up Survey for the Five State Programs

	Length of Follow-Up (in years)	Age of Focal Children		Age of Adolescents	
		Random Assignment	Follow-Up Survey	Random Assignment	Follow-Up Survey
Connecticut	3 years	2 to 9	5 to 12	9 to 13	13 to 17
Florida	4 years	1 to 8	5 to 12	9 to 13	13 to 17
Indiana	5 years	0 to 7	5 to 12	8 to 12	13 to 17
Iowa	2.5 to 6.5 years	0 to 9	5 to 12	Not applicable	Not applicable
Minnesota	3 years	2 to 9	5 to 12	10 to 18	13 to 21

**Appendix Table 3. Measures of Targeted Outcomes
(Construct, Measurement, and Scaling) Used in the Five State Programs**

Measure/scale	Definition
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up period	Construct captures the average quarterly rate of employment over the follow-up period. Unemployment Insurance records were used to determine the average quarterly rate of employment during the follow-up period. Average percent of respondents employed quarterly over the course of the follow-up.
Average annual earnings	Construct captures the average annual earnings of respondents over the follow-up period. Unemployment Insurance records were used to determine the average annual earnings from employment for respondents during the follow-up period. Average annual earnings over the follow-up period, in dollars.
Average quarterly AFDC/TANF receipt rate	Construct captures the average quarterly rate of receipt of AFDC/TANF for respondents over the course of the follow-up period. Welfare records used to determine the average quarterly AFDC/TANF receipt rate for respondents during the follow-up period. Percent of respondents receiving AFDC/TANF per quarter over the follow-up period.
Average annual welfare payments received	Construct captures the average annual welfare payments received by respondents over the course of the follow-up. Welfare records used to determine the average quarterly AFDC/TANF receipt rate for respondents during the follow-up period. Average annual welfare payments received by respondents over the follow-up period, in dollars.
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC/TANF, and Food Stamps	Construct captures the average annual income from earnings, AFDC/TANF, and Food Stamps for respondents over the course of the follow-up period. Administrative data used to determine the average annual income from earnings, AFDC/TANF, and Food Stamps for respondents during the follow-up period. Sources for administrative data vary by site: Connecticut and Florida both draw on Unemployment Insurance, AFDC/TANF, and Food Stamp records. Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota use Unemployment Insurance and AFDC/TANF records. Average annual income from earnings, AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps over the follow-up period, in dollars.

Appendix Table 3. (Continued)

Measure/scale	Definition
Total income in the month prior to the survey	<p>Construct captures respondents' reports of total household income in the month prior to the survey.</p> <p>Survey data used to determine the total income for respondents in the month prior to the survey. Income sources included in this measure vary by site:</p> <p>Connecticut: earnings, AFDC, Food Stamps, disability, child support, income from other sources, income from family and friends, and earnings from odd jobs.</p> <p>Florida: earnings, AFDC, Food Stamps, child support, SSI, and other sources.</p> <p>Indiana: earnings (all household members), Food Stamps, SSI, EITC, child support, TANF or Township trustee assistance, income from family or friends, and other sources.</p> <p>Iowa: earnings, child support, foster care or adoption assistance, Food Stamps, SSI, Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, General Assistance, and other government assistance.</p> <p>Minnesota: earnings, AFDC, Food Stamps, disability, child support, pension, and income from other sources.</p> <p>Total household income in the month prior to the survey, in dollars.</p>

Measures of Non-Targeted Outcomes

Measure/scale	Definition
At survey, primary child care arrangement was formal	<p>Construct captures whether the focal child recently used a formal setting as his/her primary child care arrangement (i.e., the arrangement used for the most hours each week).</p> <p>Parent reported whether child was using formal child care at the time of the interview. Formal care may include center or group care, summer child care, extended-day programs, clubs, and activities or lessons.</p> <p>Percent of children who used formal child care as a primary arrangement at the time of the survey.</p>
Ever any self-care	<p>Construct captures whether the focal child ever regularly cared for himself or herself over some or all of the follow-up period.</p> <p>Parent reported whether child ever cared for himself or herself at any time during some or all of the follow-up period. The time period for Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Iowa is the two years prior to the survey. The time period for Minnesota is the three years since random assignment.</p> <p>Percent of children who ever regularly cared for themselves during some or all of the follow-up period.</p>
Ever any child care	<p>Construct captures whether focal child regularly used any type of child care over some or all of the follow-up period.</p> <p>Parent reported whether child ever used any type of child care during some or all of the follow-up period. The time period for Connecticut, Indiana, and Iowa is the two years prior to the survey. The time period presented for Florida is between months 38 to 49. The time period for Minnesota is the three years since random assignment.</p> <p>Percent of children who ever regularly used any type of child care during some or all of the follow-up period.</p>

Appendix Table 3. (Continued)

Measure/scale	Definition
Ever any formal care	<p>Construct captures whether focal child ever regularly used a formal setting over some or all of the follow-up period.</p> <p>Parent reported whether child ever received formal child care during the follow-up period. Formal care may include center or group care, summer child care, extended day programs, clubs, and activities or lessons. The time period for Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Iowa is the two years prior to the survey. The time period for Minnesota is the three years since random assignment.</p> <p>Percent of children who ever regularly used formal child care over some or all of the follow-up period.</p>
Total Modified HOME scale, mean score	<p>Construct captures quality of parents' interactions with children, and a number of characteristics of the home. Interviewers also rated the quality of parent-child interactions and the quality of the physical environment.</p> <p>In Minnesota, Florida and Connecticut, all home environment items were recoded to range from 1 (an unfavorable score) to 3 (the most favorable score). In Indiana and Iowa, items were scaled from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more favorable responses. The Total Modified Home scale asks parents questions to measure the level of cognitive stimulation in the home environment, the extent to which parents have expectations of children to compete household tasks, the quality of the physical interior and exterior of the home and neighborhood (reported by the interviewer), and the quality of interaction between parents and children (reported by the interviewer).</p> <p>Number of items or questions on scale: varies by site (33 in Minnesota, 32 in Connecticut, 30 in Florida, 19 in Indiana and 16 in Iowa).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores presented. Higher scores indicate a higher quality home environment.</p>
Modified HOME Cognitive Subscale, mean score	<p>Construct captures level of cognitive stimulation in the home environment.</p> <p>In Minnesota, Florida and Connecticut, all home environment items were recoded to range from 1 (an unfavorable score) to 3 (the most favorable score). In Indiana and Iowa, items were scaled from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more favorable responses. The HOME cognitive stimulation subscale asks parents about items such as reading to children, going to the library, and the children's involvement in activities and lessons.</p> <p>Number of items: varies by site (12 in Minnesota, 10 in Connecticut, 8 in Florida, 12 in Indiana, and 11 in Iowa).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores presented. Higher scores indicate higher levels of cognitive stimulation in the home environment.</p>
Routines Scale, mean score	<p>Construct captures the extent to which the focal child engages in similar activities at the same time during the day.</p> <p>In Minnesota, Florida and Connecticut, all home environment items were recoded to range from 1 (an unfavorable score) to 3 (the most favorable score). In Indiana and Iowa, items were scaled from 1 to 4, with 1=never, 2=1-2 times per week, 3=3-5 days per week, and 4=every day or nearly every day. The routines subscale asks parents items such as whether their children go to bed at a regular time each night or do homework at the same time each evening.</p> <p>Number of items: varies by site (5 items in both Indiana and Iowa; 7 items in Minnesota, Florida and Connecticut).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores presented. Higher scores indicate more regularity of routines.</p>

Appendix Table 3. (Continued)

Measure/scale	Definition
Physical Environment Scale, mean score	<p>Construct captures the quality of the physical interior and exterior of the child's home and neighborhood.</p> <p>In Minnesota, Florida and Connecticut, all items were recoded to range from 1 (an unfavorable score) to 3 (the most favorable score). (Indiana and Iowa do not include this measure.) The physical environment scale relies on interviewer assessment of items such as the presence of health hazards in the home, the darkness and cleanliness of the home, and the presence of litter and garbage in the neighborhood.</p> <p>Number of items: varies by site (5 items in both Connecticut and Florida; Minnesota has 10 items).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores presented. Higher scores indicate a higher quality physical environment.</p>
Abuse by intimate partner in the last year	<p>Construct captures parent's experience of domestic abuse by an intimate partner in the year prior to the follow-up survey.</p> <p>Parent reported whether she had experienced any incident of domestic abuse by an intimate partner within the year prior to the survey.</p> <p>Percent of women who reported domestic abuse by an intimate partner within the year prior to the follow-up survey.</p>
Abuse by other person in the last year	<p>Construct captures parent's experience of domestic abuse by anyone other than an intimate partner in the year prior to the follow-up survey.</p> <p>Parent reported whether she had experienced any incident of domestic abuse by someone other than her intimate partner within the year prior to the survey.</p> <p>Percent of women who reported domestic abuse by anyone other than the intimate partner within the year prior to the follow-up survey.</p>
Ever any abuse since random assignment	<p>Construct captures parent's experience of any domestic abuse since random assignment.</p> <p>Parent reported whether she had experienced any incident of domestic abuse since random assignment.</p> <p>Percent of women who reported any domestic abuse at all since random assignment.</p>
Mean depression score	<p>Construct captures the frequency with which parent experienced depressive symptoms during the week prior to the follow-up survey.</p> <p>The Center for Epidemiology Studies-Depression (CES-D) scale was used (Reference Radloff, 1977, see note 34). Parents were asked, for instance, how often parent felt like not eating or felt fearful, lonely, or sad. Each item was asked on a scale of 1 "rarely [less than one day]" to 4 "most [5-7] days". Items were rescored to range from 0 to 3, with high scores indicating more depressive symptoms.</p> <p>Number of items: 20.</p> <p>Scaling: Mean summary scores (ranging from 0 to 60) are reported, with higher scores indicating higher levels of depressive symptoms.</p>

Appendix Table 3. (Continued)

Measure/scale	Definition
Parental warmth, mean score	<p>Construct captures the level of warmth shown by the parent to the focal child over the past week.</p> <p>Using a 4-point scale (in Connecticut, Florida, and Minnesota), where 1= "0 times," 2= "1-6 times," 3= "7 times or everyday," and 4= "all of the time", parent assessed the number of times the child was shown physical affection, praised, and praised to other adults over the past week. Indiana used a scale of 0 to 3, with 0=0 times in the last week, 1= 1-5 times in last week, 2=6-20 times in last week, and 3=20+ times in the last week. Iowa used a scale of 0 to 2, with 0=0 times in the last week, 1=1-5 times in the last week, and 2=6 or more times, or every day in the last week.</p> <p>Number of items: 3.</p> <p>Scaling: Total score presented as the average across the three items, with higher scores indicating more frequent expressions of warmth toward the focal child.</p>
Parental aggravation, mean score	<p>Construct captures the extent to which parent was aggravated or frustrated with the focal child.</p> <p>The focal parents answered on a 4-point scale where 1= all of the time, 2=some of the time, 3=most of the time, and 4=none of the time. Items indicated the extent to which parents felt that children were hard to care for, parents were angry with their children, and parents felt trapped by their children.</p> <p>Number of items: Number of items varied by site (6 items in Connecticut and Florida, 4 items in Minnesota, Indiana, and Iowa).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores presented (range from 1 to 4). Items were rescored so that high scores indicated greater parental aggravation.</p>
Harsh parenting, mean score	<p>Construct captures extent to which parent acted harshly or punitively toward focal child in the week prior to interview.</p> <p>Scales varied by site. In Florida and Connecticut, parents answered on a 4-point scale where 1=0 times in past week, 2= 1 time, 3= 2-6 times, and 4= 7 or more times. In Minnesota, 1= 0 times in last week, 2= 1-3 times, 3= 4-6 times, and 4= 7 or more times. In Indiana, 0= 0 times in the last week, 1= 1-5 times, 2= 6-20 times, and 3= 20+ times. Iowa used a scale of 0 to 2, with 0=0 times in the last week, 1=1-5 times in the last week, and 2=6 or more times, or every day in the last week. Items assessed, for example, the number of times in the last week the respondent lost his or her temper, scolded or yelled, spanked, or grounded the child; took away privileges from the child; or sent the child to his or her room.</p> <p>Number of items: Number of items varied by site (3 items in Indiana, Iowa and Minnesota, 6 items in Florida and Connecticut).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores (ranging from 1 to 4 in Minnesota, Florida, and Connecticut, 0 to 3 in Indiana, and 0 to 2 in Iowa) are reported, with higher scores indicating more frequent harsh parenting.</p>
Parental supervision, mean score	<p>Construct captures extent to which parent monitored the focal child's activities outside of the home.</p> <p>Using a 5-point scale, parent rated extent to which he or she knows about child's whereabouts as: 1= almost never, 2=sometimes, 3= often, 4= almost always, and 5= always. Items tapped, for example, how often respondent knew where the child was, whom the child was with, and whether the child had finished homework.</p> <p>Number of items: Number of items varied by site (7 items in Florida and Connecticut, 4 items in Minnesota and Iowa, and 5 items in Indiana).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores presented (ranging from 1 to 5), with higher scores indicating greater parental supervision.</p>

Appendix Table 3. (Continued)

Measure/scale	Definition
Currently married and living with spouse	<p>Construct captures whether parent is married and living with his or her spouse at the time of the survey.</p> <p>Parent reported whether he or she was currently married and residing with his or her spouse at the time of the survey.</p> <p>Percent of parents who report being married and living with spouse at the time of the survey.</p>
Currently married to focal child's biological father	<p>Construct captures parental report of whether parent is married to the biological father of the focal child at the time of the survey.</p> <p>Parent reported whether he or she was currently married to the biological father of the focal child at the time of the survey.</p> <p>Percent of parents who report being married to the biological father of the focal child at the time of the survey.</p>

Measures of Child Outcomes

Measure/scale	Definition
Behavior	
Behavior Problem Index (BPI) Total	<p>Construct captures frequency of focal child's behavior problems.</p> <p>Using a 3-point scale of 0=not true, 1=sometimes true, 2=often true, parent rated the focal child on items such as: has sudden changes in mood or feelings; cheats or tells lies; has difficulty concentrating, paying attention for long; bullies or is mean to others; is disobedient at home.</p> <p>Number of items: 28.</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores (ranging from 0 to 56) are reported, with higher scores indicating more problem behavior.</p>
BPI Internalizing	<p>Construct captures frequency of focal child's internalizing behavior problems.</p> <p>Using a 3-point scale of 0=not true, 1=sometimes true, 2=often true, parent rated the focal child on items such as: has sudden changes in mood or feelings; has difficulty concentrating, paying attention for long.</p> <p>Number of items: varies by site (Minnesota, 11; Florida, 13; Connecticut, 12; Indiana, 7; Iowa, 5).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean summary scores (ranging from 0 to 2) are reported, with higher scores indicating more problem behavior.</p>
BPI Externalizing	<p>Construct captures frequency of focal child's externalizing behavior problems.</p> <p>Using a 3-point scale of 0 to 2, where 0=not true, 1=sometimes true, 2=often true, parent rated the focal child on items such as: cheats or tells lies, bullies or is mean to others, and is disobedient at home.</p> <p>Number of items: varies by site (Minnesota, 12; Florida, 11; 13 items; Indiana, 11; Iowa, 11).</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores (ranging from 0 to 2) are reported, with higher scores indicating more problem behavior.</p>

Appendix Table 3. (Continued)

Measure/scale	Definition
Positive Behavior Scale (Social Competence Subscale)	<p>Construct captures frequency of focal child's positive behavior (is socially competent).</p> <p>Using an 11-point scale from 0=is not at all like your child to 10=is totally like your child, parent rated the focal child on items such as: tends to give, lend, and share; is warm, loving; and is helpful and cooperative.</p> <p>Number of items: 7.</p> <p>Scaling: Mean summary scores of 0 to 70 are reported, with higher scores indicating more positive behavior.</p>
School Outcomes	
Engagement in school	<p>Construct captures focal child's engagement in school.</p> <p>Using a 3-point scale from 1=not true, 2=sometimes true, and 3=often true, parent rated the focal child on items such as: child does enough just to get by to child does schoolwork only when forced.</p> <p>Number of items: 4.</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores presented (ranging from 4 to 12), with higher scores indicating more school engagement.</p>
Ever repeated a grade since random assignment	<p>Construct captures focal child's recent history of grade repetition.</p> <p>Parent reported whether focal child has repeated a grade since random assignment.</p> <p>Percent of focal children who repeated a grade since random assignment is reported..</p>
Ever suspended or expelled since random assignment	<p>Construct captures focal child's recent history of suspension or expulsion.</p> <p>Parent reported whether focal child has been suspended or expelled since random assignment.</p> <p>Percent of focal children who had been suspended or expelled since random assignment.</p>
Ever in special education since random assignment	<p>Construct captures focal child's recent history of attendance in special education classes.</p> <p>Parent reported whether focal child has ever been in special education since random assignment.</p> <p>Percent of focal children who had ever been in special education since random assignment is reported.</p>
Performance in school	<p>Construct captures focal child's school performance.</p> <p>Using a 5-point scale, parent rated child's performance in school as: 1=poor, 2=fair, 3=good, 4=very good, 5=excellent (in Florida study) or 1=not well at all, 2=below average, 3=average, 4=well, 5=very well (in Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota studies).</p> <p>Number of items: 1.</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores (ranging from 1 to 5) are reported, with higher scores indicating better school performance.</p>

Appendix Table 3. (Continued)

Measure/scale	Definition
Health & Safety	
In very good or excellent health	<p>Construct captures parental report of focal child's health status.</p> <p>Using a 5-point scale, parent rated child's health status as: excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor. This item was coded to determine whether the child was rated as being in "excellent" or "very good" health.</p> <p>Percent of focal children in very good or excellent health is reported.</p>
In poor health	<p>Construct captures focal child's health status.</p> <p>Using a 5-point scale, parent rated child's health status as: excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor. This item was coded to determine whether the child was rated as being in "poor" health. Indiana reports percent in "fair" or "poor" health.</p> <p>Percent of focal children fair or poor health is reported.</p>
Accident/ injury since random assignment	<p>Construct captures child's recent history of accidents or injuries requiring medical attention.</p> <p>Parent reported whether child had an accident or injury that required medical attention since random assignment. Minnesota asked about any of the respondent's children. Items vary slightly by site as to what type of medical attention was required.</p> <p>Percent of focal children who had an accident or injury since random assignment is reported.</p>

Measures of Adolescent Outcomes

Measure/scale	Definition
Performance in school	<p>Construct captures adolescent's recent school performance.</p> <p>Using a 5-point scale, parent rated child's performance in school as: 1=poor, 2=fair, 3=good, 4=very good, or 5=excellent (in Florida study) or 1=not well at all, 2=below average, 3=average, 4=well, or 5=very well in (Connecticut, Indiana, and Minnesota studies).</p> <p>Number of items: 1.</p> <p>Scaling: Mean scores (ranging from 1 to 5) are reported, with higher scores indicating better school performance.</p>
Performing very well in school	<p>Construct captures adolescent's school performance.</p> <p>Using a 5-point scale, parent rated child's school performance as: very well, well, average, below average, or not well at all. This item was coded to determine whether the child was rated as performing "very well" in school.</p> <p>Percent of adolescents who performed very well in school is reported.</p>
Performing below average in school	<p>Construct captures adolescent's school performance.</p> <p>Using a 5-point scale, parent rated child's school performance as: very well, well, average, below average, or not well at all. This item was coded to determine whether the child was rated as performing "below average or not well at all" in school.</p> <p>Percent of adolescents who performed below average in school is reported.</p>

Appendix Table 3. (Continued)

Measure/scale	Definition
Ever suspended since random assignment	Construct captures adolescent's recent history of suspensions. Parent reported whether child had been suspended since random assignment. Percent of adolescents who had been suspended since random assignment is reported.
Ever expelled since random assignment	Construct captures adolescent's recent history of expulsions. Parent reported whether child has been expelled since random assignment. Percent of adolescents who have been expelled since random assignment is reported.
Ever dropped out of school since random assignment	Construct captures adolescent's high school dropout status. Parent reported whether child had dropped out of school since random assignment. Percent of adolescents who had dropped out of school since random assignment is reported.
Ever had a baby since random assignment	Construct captures adolescent's recent childbearing history. Parent reported whether child had given birth to or fathered a baby since random assignment. Percent of adolescents who had given birth to or fathered a baby since random assignment is reported.

**Appendix Table 4. Impacts on Targeted Outcomes for Connecticut
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Full Child Sample		Most At Risk		Medium Riak		Least At Risk		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference
Focal Child Sample									
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up period (%), years 1 to 2 (administrative data)	50.0	(10.0***)	19.2	(15.1***)	42.6	(7.9***)	65.2	(4.4**)	***
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up period (%), years 3 to 4	60.8	(7.3***)	32.1	(13.4***)	51.1	(7.2***)	69.6	(2.8)	**
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up period (%) (administrative data)	49.1	(7.2***)	n/a		n/a		n/a		
Average annual earnings, in dollars, years 1 to 2 (administrative data)	4,992	(-396)	1,373	(939***)	4,115	(472**)	7,651	(122)	
Average annual earnings, in dollars, years 3 to 4	8,405	(-420)	3,527	(866*)	6,977	(827***)	11,695	(-87)	
Average annual earnings, in dollars (administrative data)	6,215	(453**)	n/a		n/a		n/a		
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%), years 1 to 2 (administrative data)	72.6	(7.6***)	85.2	(0.1)	66.8	(5.4***)	50.1	(10.6***)	***
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%), years 3 to 4	46.9	(-11.2***)	58.9	(-16.1***)	37.8	(-9.8***)	22.9	(-3.5*)	***
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%) (administrative data)	50.7	(-1.8**)	n/a		n/a		n/a		
Average annual welfare payments received in dollars, years 1 to 2 (administrative data)	4,088	(858***)	5,150	(12)	3,594	(593***)	2,365	(875***)	***
Average annual welfare payments received in dollars, years 3 to 4	2,635	(-536***)	3,364	(-941***)	2,016	(-473***)	1,118	(-125)	***
Average annual welfare payments received in dollars, (administrative data)	2,707	(59)	n/a		n/a		n/a		
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC (TANF), and Food Stamps, in dollars, years 1 to 2 (administrative data)	11,150	(1,521***)	9,003	(918***)	9,457	(1,248***)	11,216	(1,223***)	
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC (TANF), and Food Stamps, in dollars, years 3 to 4 (admin. data)	12,702	(-44)	8,875	(-163)	10,264	(344)	13,544	(-181)	
Full Administrative Sample									
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC (TANF), and Food Stamps, in dollars (administrative data)	10,376	(591***)	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a
Year 1	9,584	(1,160***)							
Year 2	10,037	(1,121***)	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a
Year 3	10,647	(172)							
Year 4	11,249	(-132)							
Year 5									
Client Survey Sample									
Total household income in the month prior to survey (survey data) in dollars ^a	1,464	(86*)	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^a Total household income includes earnings from all household members, AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp payments, Child Support and other sources. See Appendix Table 3 for further detail on measures.

n/a: not available

**Appendix Table 5. Impacts on Targeted Outcomes for Florida
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Full Child Sample		Most At Risk		Medium Riak		Least At Risk		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference
Focal Child Sample									
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up period (%) (administrative data)	48.2	(6.9***)	40.2	(7.7**)	47.2	(6.1**)	66.4	(4.6)	
Year 1	42.5	(3.4)	23.2	(8.9**)	44.3	(0.7)	72.2	(0.0)	
Year 2	46.3	(11.0***)	38.7	(12.7***)	43.5	(11.3***)	68.1	(5.0)	
Year 3	50.3	(8.9***)	47.5	(7.3*)	48.6	(9.0***)	61.7	(7.7)	
Year 4	53.7	(4.3*)	51.3	(2.0)	52.3	(3.6)	63.7	(5.6)	
Average annual earnings, in dollars (administrative data)	3,639	(958***)	2,629	(1,034***)	3,745	(846**)	6,347	(897)	
Year 1	2,544	(439**)	1,042	(339)	2,417	(479)	5,519	(545)	
Year 2	3,343	(1,159***)	2,254	(1,172***)	3,195	(947**)	5,744	(1,549**)	
Year 3	4,261	(1,263***)	3,294	(1,292**)	4,220	(1,158**)	6,295	(1,107)	
Year 4	5,208	(968***)	3,927	(1,332**)	5,148	(801)	7,831	(387)	
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%) (administrative data)	45.0	(-4.4***)	64.0	(-7.8***)	40	(-1.6)	22.9	(-3.7)	
Year 1	69.1	(2.9)	88.7	(3.5)	65.1	(5.3*)	44.3	(-3.4)	
Year 2	50.6	(-2.2)	73.3	(-4.6)	44.4	(1.8)	24.6	(-4.1)	
Year 3	36.2	(-7.6***)	56.2	(-10.3**)	30.4	(-5.5*)	15.6	(-7.5*)	
Year 4	24.2	(-10.5***)	37.7	(-19.9***)	21.3	(-8.0***)	7.2	(0.4)	***
Average annual welfare payments received, in dollars (administrative data)	1,376	(-237***)	2,150	(-355***)	1,146	(-156**)	587	(-210**)	
Year 1	2,240	(-2)	3,290	(30)	1,940	(103)	1,163	(-330**)	*
Year 2	1,533	(-235***)	2,464	(-292*)	1,247	(-163)	594	(-259**)	
Year 3	1,042	(-337***)	1,684	(-432***)	841	(-300***)	408	(-246**)	
Year 4	689	(-372***)	1,162	(-727***)	555	(-264***)	181	(-5)	***
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC (TANF), and Food Stamps, in dollars (administrative data)	7,250	(549**)	7,636	(525)	6,673	(535)	8,179	(408)	
Year 1	7,409	(223)	7,651	(311)	6,805	(331)	8,597	(-309)	
Year 2	7,065	(649**)	7,731	(645)	6,375	(569)	7,684	(878)	
Year 3	7,092	(790**)	7,653	(675)	6,546	(794)	7,734	(579)	
Year 4	7,432	(533)	7,509	(470)	6,967	(447)	8,701	(482)	
Client Survey Sample									
Total household income in the month prior to survey (survey data), in dollars ^a	1,379	(89)	1,241	(32)	1,352	(43)	1,601	(231)	

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^a Total household income includes earnings from all household members, AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp payments, Child Support, and other sources. See Appendix Table 3 for further details on measures.

**Appendix Table 6. Impacts on Targeted Outcomes for Indiana
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Full Child Sample	Least Work History	Medium Work History	Most Work History		Applicants	Ongoing Clients	
	Control Impact	Control Impact	Control Impact	Control Impact	Subgroup Difference	Control Impact	Control Impact	Subgroup Difference
Focal Child Sample								
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up period (%) (administrative data)	50.0 (4.5***)	32.1 (10.5***)	53.2 (2.0)	71.1 (1.6)	n/a	51.4 (4.5*)	49.4 (4.5**)	n/a
Average annual earnings, in dollars (administrative data)	4,734 (572**)	3,052 (1,328***)	4,453 (488)	7,378 (84)		4,894 (461)	4,652 (627**)	
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%) (administrative data)	44.1 (-5.5***)	52.8 (-7.1***)	43.2 (-8.5***)	34.3 (-3.0)		39.5 (-4.9**)	46.5 (-5.8***)	
Average annual welfare payments received, in dollars (administrative data)	1,436 (-294***)	1,757 (-316***)	1,403 (-417***)	1,063 (-216***)		1,245 (-269***)	1,535 (-307***)	
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC (TANF), and Food Stamps, in dollars (administrative data)	8,176 (153)	7,038 (903**)	7,860 (-165)	10,144 (-157)		7,898 (59)	8,321 (200)	
Year 1	7,426 (-7)	6,671 (328)	7,151 (-232)	8,872 (-83)		7,370 (-315)	7,456 (149)	
Year 2	7,579 (27)	6,517 (884**)	7,290 (-395)	9,379 (-247)	**	7,213 (-55)	7,769 (69)	
Year 3	8,054 (-101)	6,989 (644)	7,791 (-450)	9,784 (-239)		7,447 (80)	8,368 (-193)	
Year 4	8,545 (207)	7,317 (942*)	8,151 (-63)	10,738 (-127)		8,479 (-1)	8,580 (311)	
Year 5	9,247 (498)	7,629 (1,737***)	8,969 (-44)	11,872 (-309)	*	8,980 (418)	9,386 (539)	
Client Survey Sample								
Total household income in the month prior to survey (\$) (Survey Data) ^a	1,699 (-38.92)	1,714 (2.6)	1,681 (-66.7)	1,706 (-67)		1,625 (-65)	1,738 (-309)	

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^aTotal household income includes earnings from all household members, AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp payments, Child Support, and other sources. See Appendix Table 3 for further detail on measures.

n/a: not available

Appendix Table 7. Impacts on Targeted Outcomes for Iowa, by Earnings Prior to Random Assignment and by Participants' Education at Random Assignment (Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)^a

	Ongoing Applicant				Ongoing					Applicants				
					Less than High School		High School or more		Subgroup Difference	Less than High School		High School or more		Subgroup Difference
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact		Control	Impact	Control	Impact	
Focal Child Sample														
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up period (%) (administrative data)	55.3	(1.3)	67.8	(1.2)	48.1	(4.0)	59.4	(-0.2)		58.2	(2.4)	71.0	(0.3)	
Average annual earnings, in dollars (administrative data)	6,203	(-195)	10,942	(-810)	4,310	(420)	7,211	(-685)		7,946	(-34)	11,828	(-1071)	
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%) (administrative data)	58.1	(2.8)	31.1	(-0.7)	66.8	(1.0)	54.3	(3.4)		37.6	(-2.9)	29.1	(-0.4)	
Average annual welfare payments received, in dollars (administrative data)	2,390	(42)	1,139	(-83)	2,862	(-69)	2,180	(74)		1,528	(-269)	1,024	(41)	
Focal Child Sample														
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC (TANF), and Food Stamps, in dollars (administrative data)	10,288	(-143)	9,627.0	13,104	(-1,008)	9,328	(111)	10,888	(-515)	10,736	(-512)	13,813	(-1219)	
Year 1	9,067	(111)	11,663	(-631)	8,762	(304)	9,289	(-29)		10,079	(-590)	12,116	(-670)	
Year 2	9,877	(-326)	12,378	(-994)	9,616	(-693)	10,042	(-236)		9,664	(-450)	13,198	(-1223)	
Year 3	10,385	(-212)	14,727	(-1,799)	8,911	(732)	11,099	(-691)		12,191	(-1149)	15,454	(-2134)	
Year 4	10,665	(-183)	13,614	(114)	9,121	(201)	11,574	(-730)		9,492	(1911)	14,935	(-428)	
Year 5	11,448	(-106)	n/a		10,231	(13)	12,435	(-890)			n/a			
Year Prior to Survey ^b	11,448	(-106)	14,840	(-1,350)	10,231	(13)	12,435	(-890)		12,021	(-234)	15,711	(-1742)	
Client Survey Sample														
Total household income in month prior to survey (survey data), in dollars ^c	1,413	(55)	1,988(-213***)		1,109 (220**)	1,615	(9)			1,581	(13)	2,275 (-337**)		

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^aThe sample is split into ongoing recipients and applicants because of the length of the intake period. See Section II of the text for more detail.

^bYear prior to survey charts included due to the length of the intake period.

^cTotal household income includes earnings from all household members, AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp payments, Child Support, and other sources. See Appendix Table 3 for further detail on measures.

n/a: not available

Appendix Table 7. (Continued)

	Ongoing Recipients ^a					Applicants ^a					
	No Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment			No Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment			
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference	
Focal Child Sample											
Average quarterly employment rate over the follow-up period (%) (administrative data)	46.0	(0.1)	64.5	(1.9)		52.9	(-3.5)	74.7	(4.7)		
Average annual earnings, in dollars (administrative data)	4,908	(-42)	7,483	(-418)		5,987	(-335)	13,292	(-581)		
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%) (administrative data)	61.5	(2.0)	54.5	(4.1)		41.3	(-6.6)	26.3	(2.1)		
Average annual welfare payments received, in dollars (administrative data)	2,580	(78)	2,199	(30)		1,713	(-416)	862	(78)		
Focal Child Sample											
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC (TANF), and Food Stamps, in dollars (administrative data)	9,317	(-12)	11,256	(-341)		9,067	(-922)	15,011	(-770)		
Year 1	8,018	(-163)	10,111	262		8,283	(-1121)	13,242	(-167)		
Year 2	9,134	(-457)	10,570	(-183)		9,166	(-1479)	13,863	(-481)		
Year 3	9,422	(153)	11,300	(-526)		9,365	(-461)	17,299	(-2051)		
Year 4	9,437	(237)	11,893	(-663)		8,571	(1334)	16,008	(-104)		
Year 5	10,576	(173)	12,404	(-593)		n/a					
Year prior to survey ^b	10,576	(173)	12,404	(-593)		9,819	(-315)	17,267	(-1542)		
Client Survey Sample											
Total household income in month prior to survey (survey data), in dollars ^c	1,344	(146)	1,562	(15)		2,000	(-374**)	2,153	(-183)		

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^aThe sample is split into ongoing recipients and applicants because of the length of the intake period. See Section II of the text for more detail.

^bYear prior to survey charts included due to the length of the intake period.

^cTotal household income includes earnings from all household members, AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp payments, Child Support, and other sources.

See Appendix Table 3 for further detail on measures.

n/a: not available

**Appendix Table 8. Impacts on Targeted Outcomes for Minnesota
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Long-Term Recipients ^a		Recent Applicants ^a	
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact
Focal Child Sample				
Average annual employment rate over the follow-up ^b (%) (administrative data)	57.7	(15.1***)	71.2	(3.3)
Average annual earnings, in dollars (administrative data)	3,906	(751*)	7,438	(-620)
Average quarterly AFDC (TANF) receipt rate (%) (administrative data)	86.5	(4.5**)	66.2	(6.3**)
Average annual welfare payments received, in dollars (administrative data)	6,458	(556**)	3,772	(757***)
Average annual income from earnings, AFDC (TANF), and Food Stamps, in dollars (administrative data)	10,364	(1,307***)	11,210	(137)
Year 1	9,616	(1,446***)	10,364	(196)
Year 2	10,228	(1,354***)	11,031	(94)
Year 3	11,248	(1,120**)	12,235	(121)
Client Survey Sample				
Total household income in month prior to survey (survey data), in dollars ^c	1,459	(-24)	1,838	(75)

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^a Long-term recipients and recent applicants are presented separately because the program differed for these two groups.

^b The average quarterly employment rate is not available for Minnesota, so the average annual employment rate is presented.

^c Total household income includes earnings from all household members, AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp payments, Child Support, and other sources. See Appendix Table 3 for further detail on measures.

Appendix Table 9. Impacts on Non-Targeted Outcomes for Connecticut (Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)

	Full Child Sample		Most At Risk		Medium Riak		Least At Risk		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference
Child Care									
At survey, primary child care arrangement was formal (%)	7.3	(1.3)	4.1	(1.0)	8.8	(-0.6)	5.2	(9.1**)	*
Self-care (%)	4.8	(2.3*)	3.9	(2.9)	5.2	(2.2)	3.7	(2.9)	
Ever any child care (%)	83.5	(6.3***)	69.2	(17.9***)	85.1	(3.6*)	91.0	(4.8)	**
Ever any formal care (%)	43.3	(3.8)	30.3	(6.9)	46.6	(0.8)	44.9	(10.6)	
Parenting and the Home Environment									
Total Modified HOME scale, mean score (32 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.5	(0.0)	2.5	(0.0)	2.5	(-0.0)	2.5	(0.0)	
Modified HOME Cognitive Subscale, mean score (10 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.2	(0.0*)	2.1	(0.1)	2.2	(0.0)	2.3	(0.1)	
Routines Scale, mean score (7 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.5	(-0.0)	2.5	(0.0)	2.6	(-0.0*)	2.5	(-0.0)	
Physical Environment Scale, mean score (5 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.7	(0.0)	2.6	(-0.0)	2.7	(0.0)	2.8	(-0.0)	
Abuse by intimate partner last year (%)	20.8	(0.9)	17	(-1.7)	22.3	(-1.6)	16.6	(16.6***)	**
Abuse by other person last year (%)	14.9	(3.6*)	14.9	(3.3)	14.8	(4.1*)	15.7	(0.9)	
Ever any abuse since random assignment (%)	35.4	(0.4)	29.3	(0.3)	36.2	(-0.6)	35.2	(10.4*)	
Psychological Well-Being									
Total depression score (20 items, range from 0 to 60)	13.4	(0.5)	13.2	(2.4*)	13.5	(-0.2)	12.5	(2.0)	
Parental warmth, mean score (3 items, range from 1 to 4)	2.9	(-0.0)	2.8	(0.0)	2.9	(-0.1)	2.9	(-0.1)	
Parental aggravation, mean score (6 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.6	(-0.0)	1.7	(-0.1)	1.6	(-0.0)	1.6	(-0.0)	
Harsh parenting, mean score (6 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.7	(-0.1**)	1.7	(-0.1)	1.7	(-0.1**)	1.7	(0.0)	
Parental supervision, mean score (7 items, range from 1 to 5)	4.8	(0.0)	4.8	(0.0)	4.8	(-0.0)	4.8	(-0.0)	
Family Turbulence									
Currently married and living with spouse (%)	10.8	(-1.6)	7.8	(-1.1)	10.1	(-1.5)	14.7	(-1.6)	
Currently married to focal child's biological father (%)	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a		

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
n/a: not available

**Appendix Table 10. Impacts on Non-Targeted Outcomes for Florida
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Full Child Sample		Most At Risk		Medium Riak		Least At Risk		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference
Child Care									
At survey, primary child care arrangement was formal (%)	9.9	(0.2)	9.7	(-2.9)	10.1	(0.8)	9.3	(4.7)	
Ever any self-care (%)	7.1	(0.9)	5.0	(2.2)	7.2	(0.5)	9.2	(2.1)	
Ever any child care (%)	59.6	(5.5*)	59.9	(4.5)	59.6	(5.3)	61.3	(3.7)	
Ever any formal care (%)	34.2	(6.4**)	30.9	(9.8**)	35.2	(4.2)	36.6	(7.5)	
Parenting and the Home Environment									
Total Modified HOME scale, mean score (30 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.4	(0.0)	2.4	(0.0)	2.4	(-0.0)	2.5	(-0.0)	
Modified HOME Cognitive Subscale, mean score (8 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.1	(0.0)	2.1	(-0.0)	2.1	(0.0)	2.2	(0.0)	
Routines Scale, mean score (7 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.5	(0.0)	2.4	(0.1**)	2.5	(-0.0)	2.5	(-0.1*)	
Physical Environment Scale, mean score (5 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.6	(0.0**)	2.5	(0.1*)	2.6	(0.0)	2.7	(0.1)	
Abuse by intimate partner last year (%)	24.5	(-1.0)	21.7	(-2.2)	24.8	(1.6)	26.3	(-1.1)	
Abuse by other person last year (%)	19.3	(-0.9)	23.1	(-6.1)	17.6	(3.8)	16.2	(-2.3)	
Ever any abuse since random assignment (%)	42.8	(-0.8)	38.2	(-0.8)	43.2	(1.7)	47.3	(-1.9)	
Psychological Well-Being									
Total depression score (20 items, range from 0 to 60)	14.1	(-0.1)	15.7	(-1.3)	14.1	(0.4)	11.5	(0.6)	
Parental warmth, mean score (4 items, range from 1 to 4)	3.0	(0.0)	3.0	(-0.0)	3.0	(0.1*)	3.1	(-0.1)	
Parental aggravation, mean score (6 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.6	(0.0)	1.6	(-0.0)	1.6	(-0.0)	1.5	(0.1)	
Harsh parenting, mean score (3 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.6	(0.0)	1.6	(0.0)	1.6	(0.1)	1.7	(-0.1)	
Parental supervision, mean score (7 items, range from 1 to 5)	4.6	(-0.1**)	4.6	(-0.1)	4.7	(-0.0)	4.7	(-0.3***)	**
Family Turbulence									
Currently married and living with spouse (%)	19.1	(-1.9)	n/a						
Currently married to focal child's biological father (%)	n/a		n/a						

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
n/a: not available

**Appendix Table 11. Impacts on Non-Targeted Outcomes for Indiana
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Full Child Sample		Least Work History		Medium Work History		Most Work History			Applicants		Ongoing Clients		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference
Focal Child Sample														
At survey, primary child care arrangement was formal (%)	9.7	(0.0)	11.7	(2.0)	9.7	(-0.3)	6.8	(-2.8)		10.0	(-2.7)	9.5	(1.3)	
Ever any self-care (%)	6.3	(-1.2)	5.8	(2.3)	6.7	(-1.7)	6.8	(-5.7**)	**	8.6	(-3.7*)	5.1	(0.1)	
Ever any child care (%)	66.8	(6.6***)	62.3	(8.2**)	67.7	(6.7)*	71.9	(4.4)		66.0	(4.7)	67.1	(7.6***)	
Ever any formal care (%)	30.6	(3.8*)	29.4	(4.2)	30.8	(4.9)	32.4	(1.8)		37.6	(4.7)	37.2	(4.7)	
Parenting and the Home Environment														
Total Modified HOME scale, mean score (19 items, range from 0 to 1)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(-0.0)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)		0.7	(0.0)*	0.7	(0.0)	
Modified HOME Cognitive Subscale, mean score (12 items, range from 0 to 1)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(-0.0)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0*)	*	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(-0.0)	
Routines Scale, mean score (5 items, range from 1 to 4)	3.3	(0.0)	3.3	(0.0)	3.3	(0.0)	3.2	(0.0)		3.3	(0.0)	3.3	(0.0)	
Physical Environment Scale	n/a				n/a					n/a				
Abuse by intimate partner last year (%)	29.6	(1.4)	30.0	(-1.5)	29.9	(3.2)	28.6	(3.6)		29.9	(-1.9)	29.5	(3.1)	
Abuse by other person last year (%)	24.1	(-0.0)	28.2	(-7.7**)	22.0	(5.2)	20.6	(2.9)		21	(1.7)	25.6	(-1.4)	
Ever any abuse since random assignment (%)	55.0	(2.7)	53.8	(-2.4)	54.9	(4.4)	56.4	(8.2*)		53.3	(1.1)	55.7	(3.5)	
Psychological Well-Being														
Total depression score (20 items, range from 0 to 60)	15.1	(-1.0)*	15.3	(-1.3)	15.3	(-0.4)	14.7	(-1.2)		15.5	(-2.3**)	15.0	(-0.3)	
Parental warmth, mean score (3 items, range from 0 to 3)	2.7	(0.0)	2.7	(0.1)	2.7	(0.0)	2.7	(0.0)		2.8	(0.0)	2.7	(0.1)	
Parental aggravation, mean score (4 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.7	(-0.1**)	1.7	(0.0)	1.7	(0.0)	1.7	(-0.1**)		1.7	(-0.1)	1.7	(-0.1**)	
Harsh parenting, mean score (3 items, range from 0 to 3)	1.8	(0.0)	1.7	(0.0)	1.8	(0.0)	1.8	(-0.1**)		1.8	(-0.1)	1.7	(0.0)	
Parental supervision, mean score (5 items, range from 1 to 5)	4.7	(0.0)	4.7	(0.0)	4.8	(0.0)	4.7	(0.0)		4.8	(0.0)	4.7	(0.0)	
Family Turbulence														
Currently married and living with spouse (%)	23.9	(-1.4)	19.5	(-1.5)	25.5	(-1.3)	28.0	(-1.3)		23.9	(-4.0)	23.9	(-0.1)	
Currently married to focal child's biological father (%)	7.5	(-2.0*)	6.8	(-1.5)	10.3	(-4.7**)	4.3	(1.2)		10.9	(-3.7*)	5.7	(-1.1)	

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
n/a: not available

**Appendix Table 12. Impacts on Non-Targeted Outcomes for Iowa
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Ongoing Applicant				Ongoing					Applicants				
					Less than High School		High School or more			Less than High School		High School or more		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference
Child Care														
At survey, primary child care arrangement was formal (%)	9.4	(-1.3)	5.9	(4.6**)	6.9	(-2)	9.5	(-0.1)		5.1	(2.5)	6.3	(5.6*)	
Self-care (%) (any hours)	12.2	(-1.1)	10.9	(4.4*)	12.8	(-5.6)	11.0	(0.4)		4.9	(3.2)	12.5	(3.0)	
Any current child care (%)	77.1	(0.8)	83.3	(-1.5)	71.6	(2.6)	79.1	(1.1)		75.5	(2.3)	86.0	(-3.4)	
Ever any formal care (%) (past 2 years)	39.9	(-1.5)	45.0	(2.2)	29.6	(-2.4)	44.2	(-0.7)		42.2	(-0.5)	46.2	(2.8)	
Parenting and the Home Environment														
Total Modified HOME scale, mean score (16 items, range from 0 to 1)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(-0.0)	0.7 (-0.0**)		0.7(0.0**)		***	0.7	(0.0)	0.8	(0.0)	
Modified HOME Cognitive Subscale, mean score (11 items, range from 0 to 1)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(-0.0)	0.7 (.0.0)		0.7(0.0***)		**	0.6	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)	
Routines Scale, mean score (5 items, range from 1 to 4)	3.4	(0.0)	3.4	(0.0)	3.4 (0.0)		3.4 (0.0)			3.4 (-0.2*)		3.4	(0.0)	
Physical Environment Scale	n/a				n/a					n/a				
Abuse by intimate partner last year (%) (measure is taken from random assignment, not in the past year)	23.2	(6.8*)	19.8	(8.1**)	22.1 (5.6)		24.0 (7.0)			18.3 (4.2)		20.8 (8.0*)		
Abuse by other person last year (%)	n/a				n/a					n/a				
Ever any abuse since random assignment (%)	49.8	(3.2)	42.6	(6.7)	49.6 (1.9)		50.0 (3.5)			46.8 (-5.3)		41.5 (10.3*)		
Psychological Well-Being														
Total depression score (20 items, range from 0 to 60)	12.6	(0.0)	9.1	(1.2)	14.2 (0.6)		11.9 (-0.4)			9.9 (4.4**)		8.9 (0.1)		**
Parental warmth, mean score (Range of 0 to 2)	1.8	(0.0)	1.8	(0.0)	1.8 (0.0)		1.8 (0.0)			1.7 (0.0)		1.8 (0.0)		
Parental aggravation, mean score (4 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.6	(0.0)	1.6	(0.0)	1.6 (0.0)		1.6 (-0.1)			1.6 (0.0)		1.6 (-0.1)		
Harsh parenting, mean score (Range from 0 to 2)	0.5	(0.0)	0.5	(0.0)	0.5 (0.0)		0.5 (0.0)			0.4 (0.1)		0.6 (-0.1)		*
Parental supervision, mean score (4 items, range from 1 to 5)	4.6	(0.0)	4.7	(0.0)	4.6 (0.0)		4.6 (0.1)			4.6 (0.1)		4.8 (-0.1)		
Family Turbulence														
Currently married and living with spouse (%)	27.2	(1.5)	44.9	(-4.4)	28.3 (-2.5)		25.5 (0.6)			45.3 (-4.5)		43.8 (-2.6)		
Currently married to focal child's biological father (%)	12.7	(-3.7)	23.0	(-0.1)	13.4 (-6.8*)		10.5 (-0.9)			27.2 (-6.8)		21.6 (0.4)		

NOTE: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
n/a: not available

Appendix Table 12. (Continued)

	Ongoing Recipients ^a					Applicants ^a				
	No Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Subgroup Difference	No Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Subgroup Difference
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact		Control	Impact	Control	Impact	
Child Care										
At survey, primary child care arrangement was formal (%)	8.9	(-1.7)	9.8	(-0.8)		8.0	(-1.7)	4.8	(7.6***)	*
Ever any self-care (%) (any hours; past 2 years)	10.3	(0.7)	13.4	(-3.4)		15.6	(-4.2)	8.9	(5.8*)	*
Ever any child care (%) (past 2 years)	74.1	(-0.1)	79.3	(2.6)		86.8	(-7.5)	81.5	(0.5)	
Ever any formal care (%) (past 2 years)	39.3	(-5.8)	40.3	(2.2)		59.0	(-10.6)	38.2	(8.0)	**
Parenting and the Home Environment										
Total Modified HOME scale, mean score (16 items, range from 0 to 1)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)		0.7	(0.0)	0.8	(0.0)	
Modified HOME Cognitive Subscale, mean score (11 items, range from 0 to 1)	0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)		0.7	(0.0)	0.7	(0.0)	
Routines Scale, mean score (5 items, range from 1 to 4)	3.5	(0.0)	3.4	(0.0)		3.4	(0.0)	3.4	(0.0)	
Physical Environment Scale			n/a					n/a		
Abuse by intimate partner last year (%)	23.4	(6.5)	23.3	(6.7)		23.7	(2.5)	18.1	(10.6**)	
Abuse by other person last year (%)			n/a					n/a		
Ever any abuse since random assignment (%)	46.5	(7.4)	52.8	(-0.3)		47.0	(0.3)	40.8	(9.6*)	
Psychological Well-Being										
Total depression score (20 items, range from 0 to 60)	13.9	(-0.2)	11.4	(0.2)		11.0	(1.5)	8.2	(1.1)	
Parental warmth, mean score (range of 0 to 2)	1.8	(0.0)	1.8	(0.0)		1.8	(0.0)	1.8	(0.0)	
Parental aggravation, mean score (4 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.7	(0.0)	1.6	(0.0)		1.6	-0.1	1.6	(0.0)	
Harsh parenting, mean score (Range from 0 to 2)	0.5	(0.0)	0.5	(0.0)		0.5	(0.0)	0.5	(0.0)	
Parental supervision, mean score (4 items, range from 1 to 5)	4.5	(0.1*)	4.7	(0.0)	*	4.7	(0.0)	4.7	(0.0)	
Family Turbulence										
Currently married and living with spouse (%)	25.5	(0.1)	28.7	(-2.8)		43.1	(-8.8)	45.8	(-2.1)	
Currently married to focal child's biological father (%)	8.3	(-0.6)	15.5	(-5.8)		22.6	(-2.5)	22.8	(-0.6)	

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^aThe sample is split into ongoing recipients and applicants because of the length of the intake period. See Section II of the text for more detail.

n/a: not available

**Appendix Table 13. Impacts on Non-Targeted Outcomes for Minnesota
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Long-Term Recipients ^a		Recent Applicants ^a	
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact
Child Care				
At survey, primary child care arrangement was formal (%)	16.0	(1.8)	20.5	(3.3)
Ever any self-care (%)	16.2	(-2.5)	18.1	(2.2)
Ever any child care (%)	78.0	(9.9***)	87.8	(-0.9)
Ever any formal care (%)	42.3	(10.6***)	48.8	(4.9)
Parenting and the Home Environment				
Mean Total Modified HOME scale (33 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.3	(0.0)	2.4	(-0.0)
Modified HOME Cognitive Subscale, mean score (12 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.2	(0.0)	2.3	(0.0)
Routines Scale, mean score (7 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.3	(0.0)	2.3	(0.0)
Physical Environment Scale, mean score (10 items, range from 1 to 3)	2.5	(-0.0)	2.6	(-0.0)
Abuse by intimate partner in last year (%)	28.5	(-6.7*)	19.1	(2.2)
Abuse by other person in last year (%)	33.0	(-8.4**)	23.1	(3.8)
Ever any abuse since random assignment (%)	59.6	(-10.5**)	49.1	(-0.4)
Psychological Well-Being				
Total depression score (20 items, range from 0 to 60)	19.0	(-1.5)	14.2	(1.0)
Mean warmth (3 items, range from 1 to 4)	3.5	(0.0)	3.4	(0.1)
Mean aggravation (4 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.9	(-0.1)	1.7	(0.0)
Mean harsh parenting (6 items, range from 1 to 4)	1.7	(0.0)	1.5	(0.1**)
Mean supervision (4 items, range from 1 to 5)	4.5	(0.1**)	4.6	(-0.1)
Family Turbulence				
Currently married and living with spouse (%)	6.2	(5.0**)	20.8	(2.7)
Currently married to focal child's biological father (%)	0.9	(1.8)	8.2	(1.8)

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^aLong-term recipients and recent applicants are presented separately because the program differed for these two groups.

**Appendix Table 14. Impacts on Focal Child Well-Being for Connecticut
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Focal Child Sample		Most At Risk		Medium Risk		Least At Risk		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Differences
Education									
Engagement in school (4 items, range from 4 to 12)	10.6	(0.1)	10.3	(0.4)	10.6	(0.2)	10.9	(-0.2)	**
Ever repeated a grade since random assignment (%)	14.7	(1.3)	n/a		n/a		n/a		
Ever suspended or expelled since random assignment (%)	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a		
Ever in special education since random assignment (%)	14	(1.2)	14.6	(4.4)	11.9	(3.1)	21.9	(-9.5**)	
Performance in school (range from 1 to 5)	4.2	(-0.0)	4.3	(-0.0)	4.2	(0.0)	4.3	(-0.1)	
Social and Emotional Adjustment									
Behavioral Problems Index (BPI) total score (28 items, range from 0 to 56)	9.2	(-0.9**)	9.9	(-1.9*)	9.0	(-0.6)	9.3	(-1.0)	
BPI externalizing mean score (13 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.3	(-0.0*)	0.4	(-0.1**)	0.3	(-0.0)	0.3	(-0.0)	
BPI internalizing mean score (12 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.3	(-0.0**)	0.3	(-0.1)	0.3	(-0.0)	0.3	(-0.0)	
Positive Behavior Scale total score (7 items, range from 0 to 70)	60.8	(1.0*)	60.6	(1.3)	61.0	(1.1)	60.8	(0.0)	
Health and Safety									
In very good or excellent health (%)	81.2	(3.3*)	77.7	(-1.4)	80.3	(5.1**)	86.5	(4.0)	
In poor health (%)	4.7	(-1.0)	6.4	(-0.5)	5.3	(-1.9)	1.2	(1.6)	
Accident or injury since random assignment (%)	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a		

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
n/a: not available

**Appendix Table 15. Impacts on Focal Child Well-Being for Florida
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Focal Child Sample		Most At Risk		Medium Riak		Least At Risk		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference
Education									
Engagement in school (4 items, range from 4 to 12)	10.1	(0.0)	10.1	(0.0)	10.2	(0.0)	10.3	(-0.0)	
Ever repeated a grade since random assignment (%)	24.8	(1.0)	32.3	(-6.5)	22.1	(3.1)	18.9	(7.8)	*
Ever suspended or expelled since random assignment (%)	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a		
Ever in special education since random assignment (%)	10.1	(2.2)	10.6	(1.3)	9.5	(2.8)	10.3	(2.7)	
Performance in school (range from 1 to 5)	4.0	(0.1)	3.8	(0.2*)	4.0	(0.2**)	4.2	(-0.3**)	***
Social and Emotional Adjustment									
Behavioral Problems Index (BPI) total score (28 items, range from 0 to 56)	10.9	(-0.1)	11.3	(-0.8)	10.6	(0.0)	10.6	(1.3)	
BPI externalizing mean score (11 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.4	(0.0)	0.4	(-0.0)	0.4	(0.0)	0.4	(0.0)	
BPI internalizing mean score (13 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.4	(0.0)	0.4	(-0.0)	0.3	(0.0)	0.3	(0.1)	
Positive Behavior Scale total score (7 items, range from 0 to 70)	60.2	(-1.2*)	60.6	(-1.2)	59.2	(-1.3)	59.5	(-1.9)	
Health and Safety									
In very good or excellent health (%)	73.2	(6.3**)	69.9	(6.1)	72.1	(8.2**)	83.3	(-1.4)	
In poor health (%)	6.2	(-2.7**)	6.2	(-1.5)	7.1	(-4.6**)	4.0	(-0.3)	
Accident or injury since random assignment (%)	14.3	(0.4)	10.6	(3.1)	15.5	(-1.1)	17.7	(-0.5)	

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
n/a: not available

**Appendix Table 16. Impacts on Focal Child Well-Being for Indiana
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Focal Child Sample		Least Work History		Medium Work History		Most Work History			Applicants		Ongoing Clients		
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Subgroup Difference
Education														
Engagement in school (4 items, range from 4 to 12)	10.3	(0.0)	10.3	(0.0)	10.5	(-0.2)	10.2	(0.1)		10.4	(0.1)	10.3	(-0.1)	
Ever repeated a grade since random assignment (%)	13.4	(-0.7)	10.0	(3.6)	19.1	(-4.7)	10.5	(-1.1)		10.8	(0.1)	14.6	(-0.9)	
Ever suspended or expelled since random assignment (%)	6.5	(0.9)	4.2	(1.4)	7.3	(1.0)	8.7	(0.0)		3.7	(1.8)	7.9	(0.4)	
Ever in special education since random assignment (%)	10.7	(2.3)	8.3	(4.2)	12.2	(0.5)	12.3	(1.7)		9.3	(2.9)	11.4	(1.9)	
Performance in school (FC) (range from 1 to 5)	4.2	(0.0)	4.2	(-0.2*)	4.2	(0.0)	4.1	(0.2**)	**	4.3	(0.1)	4.1	(0.0)	
Social and Emotional Adjustment														
Behavioral Problems Index (BPI) total score (28 items, range from 0 to 56)	12.0	(-0.5)	11.7	(-0.4)	12.0	(0.3)	12.4	(-1.9**)		12.0	(-0.9)	11.9	(-0.4)	
BPI externalizing mean score (11 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.5	(-0.0)	0.5	(0.0)	0.5	(0.0)	0.5	(0.0)		0.5	(-0.0)	0.5	(-0.0)	
BPI internalizing mean score (7 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.3	(0.0)	0.3	(0.0)	0.3	(0.0)	0.3	(-0.1***)		0.3	(-0.0)	0.3	(-0.0)	
Positive Behavior Scale total score (7 items, range from 0 to 70)	57.7	(0.3)	57.4	0.0	57.8	(-0.3)	58.2	(1.6)		58.5	(1.1)	57.4	(-0.1)	
Health and Safety														
In very good or excellent health (%)	75.7	(0.6)	76.5	(-4.5)	74.8	(0.9)	75.5	(7.9**)	*	74.1	(6.8*)	76.5	(-2.5)	**
In fair or poor health (%)	6.0	(0.2)	6.1	(-1.7)	7.8	(0.6)	3.3	(-2.3)		8.8	(-2.2)	4.5	(1.5)	
Accident or injury since random assignment (%)	25.5	(-0.6)	22.9	(-2.5)	24.3	(4.2)	31.2	(-4.4)		21.5	(-3.5)	27.7	(0.9)	

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

**Appendix Table 17. Impacts on Focal Child Well-Being for Iowa
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)^a**

	Ongoing Applicant				Ongoing					Applicants				
					Did Not Complete High School		Graduated from High School		Subgroup Difference	Did Not Complete High School		Graduated from High School		Subgroup Difference
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact	Control	Impact		Control	Impact	Control	Impact	
Education														
Engagement in school (4 items range from 4 to 12)	10.2	(0.0)	10.6	(-0.4**)	10.3	(-0.4)	10.1	(0.2)	*	10.2	(-0.3)	10.8	(-0.5***)	
Ever repeated a grade since random assignment (%)	8.2	(-0.5)	6.2	(-3)	13.4	(-4.5)	6.7	(-0.7)		5.9	(-1.3)	6.4	(-3.5)	
Ever suspended or expelled since random assignment (%)	8.0	(-1)	4.9	(2.5)	5.2	(4.4)	8.7	(-4.0*)	*	9.0	(2.3)	3.3	(2.4)	
Ever in special education since random assignment (%)	24.5	(-1.7)	22.4	(-1.7)	25.7	(2.9)	24.5	(-4.0)		24.1	(-0.1)	21.0	(-1.7)	
Performance in school (range from 1 to 5)	4.0	(0.0)	4.1	(0.1)	3.9	(0.0)	4.1	(0.1)		4.0	(0.1)	4.2	(0.0)	
Social and Emotional Adjustment														
Behavioral Problems Index (BPI) total score, (28 items, range from 0 to 56)	12.0	(-0.2)	10.9	(0.4)	11.9	(2.0)	12.0	(-1.2)	*	14.6	(-1.2)	9.8	(0.9)	
BPI externalizing mean score (11 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.2	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	0.2	(-0.0**)	**	0.3	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	
BPI internalizing mean score (5 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.2	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	0.2	(0.1)	0.2	(0.0)		0.3	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	
Positive Behavior Scale total score (7 items, range from 0 to 70)	57.8	(0.4)	59.0	(-0.3)	58.7	(-1.8)	57.4	(1.3)		56.0	(0.3)	60.1	(-0.8)	
Health and Safety														
In very good or excellent health (%)	83.2	(-0.3)	83.9	(0.5)	83.2	(-5.8)	82.3	(3.6)		86.0	(-8.9)	83.1	(3.9)	
In fair or poor health (%)	3.9	(1.6)	3.5	(-0.1)	5.0	(1.4)	3.0	(1.5)		12.8	(-10.8*)	0.7	(3.5**)	**
Accident or injury since random assignment (%)	32.9	(-0.8)	27.8	(5.8)	27.8	(0.7)	35.9	(-2.4)		25.4	(3.8)	28.2	(7.0)	

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^a The sample is split into ongoing recipients and applicants because of the length of the intake period. See section II of the text for more detail.

Appendix Table 17. (Continued)

	Ongoing Recipients ^a					Applicants ^a				
	No Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Subgroup Difference	No Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Earnings in Year Prior to Random Assignment		Subgroup Difference
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact		Control	Impact	Control	Impact	
Education										
Engagement in school 4 items (range from 4 to 12)	10.1	(-0.1)	10.2	(0.1)		10.4	(-0.2)	10.7	(-0.5**)	
Ever repeated a grade since random assignment (%)	9.8	(-1.7)	7.3	(-0.3)		11.6	(-7.4)	3.5	(-1)	
Ever suspended/ expelled since random assignment (%)	7.2	(-1.0)	8.8	(-2.3)		9.3	(-1.8)	2.3	(4.1*)	
Ever in special education since random assignment (%)	25.0	(-0.2)	24.6	(-4.1)		33.9 (-18.2***)		15.6	(5.3)	***
Performance in school (range from 1 to 5)	4.1	(0.1)	4.0	(0.1)		4.0	(0.2)	4.2	(0.0)	
Social and Emotional Adjustment										
Behavioral Problems Index (BPI) total score (28 items, range from 0 to 56)	12.5	(-0.7)	11.4	(0.3)		11.8	(-0.2)	10.5	(0.5)	
BPI externalizing mean score (11 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.2	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)		0.2	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	
BPI internalizing mean score (5 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.3	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)		0.2	(0.0)	0.2	(0.0)	
Positive Behavior Scale total score (7 items, range from 0 to 70)	57.3	(1.2)	58.4	(-0.4)		59.0	(-0.5)	58.9	(-0.2)	
Health and Safety										
In very good or excellent health (%)	80.6	(1.6)	85.9	(-2.4)		84.2	-1.1	83.5	(1.4)	
In fair or poor health (%)	4.1	(0.5)	3.0	(2.8)		5.5	-4.7*	2.3	(2.4)	*
Accident or injury since random assignment (%)	33.9	(-1.6)	31.6	(0.5)		23.0	6.8	29.6	(5.9)	

Notes: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^a The sample is split into ongoing recipients and applicants because of the length of the intake period. See section II of the text for more detail.

**Appendix Table 18. Impacts on Focal Child Well-Being for Minnesota
(Control Group Levels and Program Impacts)**

	Long-Term Recipients ^a		Recent Applicants ^a	
	Control	Impact	Control	Impact
Education				
Engagement in school (4 items, range from 4 to 12)	9.9	(0.3**)	10.4	(-0.2)
Ever repeated a grade since random assignment (%)	3.6	(1.8)	4.6	(-2.6)
Ever suspended/ expelled since random assignment (%)	12.9	(-1.5)	6.2	(4.4*)
Ever in special education since random assignment (%)	22.5	(-4.5)	17.4	(-1.9)
Performance in school (range from 1 to 5)	4.0	(0.2*)	4.3	(-0.1)
Social and Emotional Adjustment				
Behavioral Problems Index (BPI) total score (28 items, range from 0 to 56)	12.7	(-1.5*)	9.8	(1.0)
BPI externalizing mean score (12 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.5	(-0.1**)	0.4	(0.0)
BPI internalizing mean score (11 items, range from 0 to 2)	0.4	(-0.0)	0.4	(0.0)
Positive Behavior Scale total score (7 items, range from 0 to 70)	57.4	(0.1)	59.4	(-1.1)
Health and Safety				
In very good or excellent health (%)	77.8	(-2.8)	78.7	(-1.4)
In poor health (%)	7.8	(1.0)	5.2	(1.7)
Accident or injury since random assignment (MFIP asks about any child) (%)	36.9	(7.1*)	43.5	(1.4)

Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

^aLong-term recipients and recent applicants are presented separately because the program differed for these two groups. See section II of the text for more detail.

Appendix Table 19. Effect Size Ranges for Significant Impacts on Children and Adolescents

	Full Focal Child Samples	Focal Child Subgroup Samples	Adolescent Samples
Connecticut	0.08 to 0.10 (5 impacts)	0.13; 0.22 to 0.28 (4 impacts)	0.14, 0.24, 0.17 (3 impacts)
Florida	0.11, 0.14 (3 impacts)	0.31, 0.19, 0.20 (3 impacts)	0.13 to 0.17 (2 impacts)
Indiana	Not applicable (no impacts)	0.15 to 0.35 (6 impacts)	0.14, 0.15 (2 impacts)
Iowa	0.23 (1 impact)	Not applicable (no subgroups)	Not applicable (no data for adolescents)
Minnesota	0.14 to 0.19 (6 impacts)	Not applicable (no subgroups)	0.22 to 0.25 (4 impacts)

^aLong-term recipients and recent applicants are presented separately because the program differed for these two groups. See section II of the text for more detail.

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